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INTRODUCTION
All constitutional scholars agree that the text of the Constitution
furnishes the starting point for constitutional interpretation; 1 and
1 See, e.g., Monaghan, Our Prfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 361 (1981)
("Most commentators agree that analyses grounded either in the constitutional text
or in the structure it creates constitute valid modes of reasoning about constitutional
'meaning.'"); Moore, A Natural Law Theoy of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279,
313 (1985) (stating that "in legal interpretation there must be a place for ordinary
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most scholars agree that the text alone is rarely enough.2 The
Constitution's many broad prescriptions must be interpreted in
accordance with various external guides.3 Constitutional theorists
typically posit four sources which, together with the text, contribute
to a "proper" understanding of the Constitution: original intent
(history), 4 constitutional scholarship, 5 precedent, 6 and contempo-
meaning [of words]"); Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv.
797, 797 (1982) (stating that "before we can argue... about whether to go outside
of the text, we ought to explore the meaning of the words inside the text"); see also
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (stating that § 2 of the fourteenth
amendment "is as much a part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and
how it became a part of the Amendment is less important than what it says and what
it means"); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (stating that the
Constitution is the "authoritative language of the American people").
2 See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 205 (1980) ("The text of the Constitution is authoritative, but many of its
provisions are treated as inherently open-textured."); Fallon, A Constuctivist Coherence
Theoty of Constitutional Inteipretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (1987) ("[W]hile
arguments from text occupy the topmost rung of the theoretical hierarchy, it seldom
occurs that purely textual arguments unambiguously require a result contrary to that
indicated by several other factors.").
3 Seegenerally Fallon, supra note 2, at 1244-46 (noting that constitutional interpre-
tation is based upon arguments from the text, historical intent, theory, precedent, and
values); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theomy of Constitutional
"Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 552 (1985) (describing as the bases for
interpreting constitutional questions: the text of the Constitution, political morality
constitutionalized by the ratifiers of the Constitution, precedent, the values of the
political community, and the judge's own values).
4 See, e.g., Bork, Original Intent: The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional Decision
Making, JUDGES'J., Summer 1987, at 13, 13 (stating that the judge is bound by "the
original intentions of those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Constitution");
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 360 (stating that "the original intent is the proper mode
of ascertaining constitutional meaning"). But see Brennan, My Encounters With the
Constitution, JUDGES'J., Summer 1987, at 7, 10 (stating that "the ultimate question
must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time?").
5 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1200-02; see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICs 36 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
A. BICKEL (2d ed. 1986)] (stating that constitutional "construction involves hospitality
to large purposes [and policy choices], not merely textual exegesis"); J. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSID-
ERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 68 (1980) (stating that because the
members of the Court do not rely on the political system for maintaining their
positions, they are guaranteed of making nonpolitical decisions);J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 56 (1980) ("The constitutional
literature that has dominated the past thirty years has often insisted that judges, in
seeking constitutional value judgments, should '.. . . follow the ways of the scholar
in pursuing the ends of government.'" (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 25-26 (1962))); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1959) (maintaining that arguments based on reason and
principle supplement as a means of interpreting the Constitution).
6 See, e.g., J. STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 8 (1985) ("Constitutionality issues
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rary values. 7 These sources8 provide the authority that guides and
restrains constitutional interpretation.9 Although unrecognized as
such, constitutional fact-finding comprises another, and equally
important, source of authority. Constitutional fact-finding has
always been an essential part of the interpretive calculus. Indeed,
throughout its history, and to this day, the Supreme Court, 10 in
practice, equates fact-finding with the traditional sources of
authority. The Court fails to distinguish between normative
principles and empirical propositions, analyzing empirical re-
search 1 as it might arguments about the text or precedent. The
involve ... the meaning of preceding judicial decisions interpreting the texts.");
Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 249 (1976) ("In a legal system such as ours ... the published decisions of
courts and administrative agencies interpreting and applying the legislative enact-
ments are important sources of the specific rules of law."); Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 572 (1987) (stating that courts of law appeal to precedent in their
decisionmaking).
7 See, e.g., Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporay Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L.J. 433, 438 (1986) ("CurrentJustices read the Constitution in the only
way that we can: as twentieth-century Americans."); Brest, supra note 2, at 228-34
("Precedents are modified and even overruled to reflect perceived changes in social
needs and values."). See generally Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial
Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339, 351-56 (1987) (describing the use of contemporary.
morality in judicial review).
8 While most scholars agree on these five sources, some define them slightly
differently. See, e.g., P. BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 7, 94 (1982) (listing six sources for constitutional argument: historical, textual,
doctrinal, prudential, structural, and (his own element) ethical).
9 Of course, constitutional theorists do not uniformly accept all five sources as
legitimate. Many theorists, collectively referred to as "interpretivists," accept only the
text and original intent as viable authority for explicating the Constitution's meaning.
See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 407-18 (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 693 (1976). Even these theorists, however, recognize the remaining three
sources as playing some role, albeit a mistaken one, in constitutional interpretation.
See R. BERGER, supra, at 283-99; Bork, supra, at 10-12; Rehnquist, supra, at 700-06.
10 This Article focuses on the Supreme Court, rather than lower federal courts or
state courts, as a matter of convenience. I would expect to find in those courts
interpretive practices that are similar to those attributed to the Supreme Court here.
Cf White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right
toJuiy Tria, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 n.31, 24 (1989) (observing "constitutional
fact-finding" in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
11 When available, empirical data inform the Court about factual circumstances.
Professor Marvell observes that empirical data includes "scientific, social science,
behavioral science, statistical, or other technical information about what happens in
the world." T. MARVELL, APPELATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHER-
ING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 186 (1978). Of course, many other "facts" have
constitutional significance other than those categorized here as "empirical." For
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Court "interprets" facts, it does not "find" them. In the past, this
course served the Court well, for the Justices could surmise
constitutional facts12 on their own at least as well as anybody else
could. Increasingly, however, scientists are challenging the Court
with empirical data far richer and more accurate than the supposi-
tions that thoughtful reflection can provide.1 3 Science 14 modifies
and strengthens the role of fact-finding in constitutional interpreta-
tion and actually constitutes a hallmark of constitutional theory,
guiding and restraining the Court's constitutional discretion.
Historically, most constitutional fact-finding depended on the
Justices' best guess about the matter. In Gibbons v. Ogden,15 for
example, Chief Justice Marshall could assert, with little fear of
contradiction, that "[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly
understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation."
I6
This factual observation was as much law-makingas Marshall's legal
conclusion in the same decision that "our constitution [is] one of
enumeration, and not of definition." 17 Marshall's assertion about
instance, historical facts have traditionally occupied a large role in constitutional
interpretation, being especially relevant to discussions of original intent. For further
discussion on my distinction between empirical facts and other kinds of facts, see
infra note 18.
12 For discussion of the nature of "constitutional facts," see infra notes 18 & 32-47
and accompanying text.
13 See Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: The Actual
and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
25 (1990).
14 This Article focuses on the social sciences because they have been the sciences
accorded particular attention by the Supreme Court. But the discussion herein
applies equally to the Court's use of natural science research, as the discussion of Roe
v, Wade will make clear. See infra notes 123-42 and accompanying text. In fact, I
prefer not to distinguish between the natural sciences and the social sciences in
regard to their respective relevance to legal decisionmaking. See Faigman, To Have
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to Law as Science and Policy, 38
EMORY LJ. 1005 (1989). At bottom, the value of a statement "as science" depends
on its "validity." Similarly, the legal relevance of a social science statement or a
natural science statement should also depend on its validity. See id. at 1018; i'ra
notes 107-15 and accompanying text. "[V]alidity refer[s] to the best available
approximation to the truth or falsity of propositions, including propositions about
cause." T. COOK & D. CAMPBELL, QUAsI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS
ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37 (1979). Validity must be contrasted with "reliability,"
which refers to the ability of a scientific test to obtain consistent results. For
example, a reliable thermometer consistently measures air temperature and, if valid,
does so accurately. A valid test will always be reliable, but a reliable test will not
always be valid. A thermometer always ten degrees too high will be consistently
inaccurate-reliable, but invalid.
15 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
16 Id. at 190.
17 Id. at 189. This example also serves to illustrate social scientists' typical
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America's understanding of the word commerce lent force to his
reading of the commerce clause, but was not necessary to his
conclusion. Marshall's empirical observation served a rhetorical
purpose, being pertinent only insofar as it advanced his interpretive
judgment, and empirical evidence to the contrary surely would not
have influenced the outcome.
Yet, the Court's casual interweaving of fact and law could
continue only so long as its "best guesses" about constitutional
facts' 8 were as good as, or at least not too far from, everyone
else's. After all, if Marshall had been confronted, say, with a valid
scientific study showing that America's understanding of commerce
was not as broad as he supposed, the legitimacy of his conclusion
would have been undermined. The Gibbons edifice would not have
fallen upon such a showing, but it would have been shaken by the
response to those situations in which the Court raises empirical questions. For
instance, if today's Court observed that all America understands "the word 'com-
merce' to comprehend navigation." social scientists would quickly conduct surveys to
test the proposition. But this response would demonstrate social scientists' basic
misunderstanding of the Court's method. Often the Court asks empirical questions
rhetorically, with no real interest in the answer and with no intent to change its
holding whatever the data show. The problem, of course, is how scientists can know
when the Court really wants an empirical question answered, and whether they should
invest the time and resources answering empirical questions given this uncertainty.
These questions are addressed in Section III. See infra notes 270-82 and accompany-
ing text.
18 1 use the term "constitutional fact" to refer to those facts identified as being
relevant either to the establishment of a constitutional rule or reviewable under an
established constitutional rule. For a further discussion of this distinction see infra
notes 32-47 and accompanying text. My main concern here is constitutional facts
discoverable through empirical research. Many constitutional facts will not be
amenable to empirical research, because either they are incapable of being tested or
they are historical in nature. Marshall's query in Gibbons concerning America's
understanding of the word "commerce" raises two kinds of factual questions, the first
concerning America's past understanding of the term and the second concerning
America's present understanding. Marshall's inquiry into America's past understand-
ing of the word is a constitutional fact subject to historical inquiry, while present
understanding of the word "commerce" (i.e., at the time Marshall asked the question)
constitutes an empirical question. Whereas historical facts are subject to scholarly
discovery, empirical facts can be scientifically tested. For instance, social scientists can
survey the relevant populations to determine a people's understanding of the word
"commerce." This option obviously is not available to historians.
History shares the same essential objective as science: truth. In their quest to
attain this objective, both disciplines must navigate the complexity of their subject as
well as control for the pervasive value-bias inherent in all human inquiry. For a
fuller discussion of the objectivity of science and the distinction between science and
nonscience, see Faigman, supra note 14. For a discussion of the value of history as
a source of "truth" in legal decisionmaking, see Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237, 1245, 1250-56 (1986).
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loss of one of its pillars. Although Marshall may have been spared
such scientific challenges to his factual assumptions, the modern
Court has been less fortunate. Today's Court struggles often, and
often unsuccessfully, to incorporate contemporary science into its
constitutional decision-making.
In examining the role of fact-finding in constitutional theory,
this Article focuses on the modern Court's use of empirical research
in its constitutional law-making. In addition to providing insights
into the integration of science and the law, this examination helps
illuminate the relationship between fact and value in constitutional
interpretation. Constitutional theorists have completely ignored the
significance fact-finding plays in establishing the meaning and
application of the Constitution.1 9 Constitutional cases are replete
with instances of factual suppositions supplying the fulcrum for
discerning the "proper" understanding of the Constitution, as well
as supplying the foundation supporting the soundness and legitima-
cy of the particular ruling.
Judicial review, as many commentators have observed, irreconcil-
ably conflicts with political democracy.2 0 An unelected judiciary
passing on the validity of laws promulgated by elected representa-
tives is at variance with the basic principles of democracy.2 1 The
19 Although commentators have ignored the importance of constitutional fact-
finding to constitutional interpretation, several commentators have written on the
function of fact-findingin constitutional adjudication. See Bikle,JudicialDetennination
of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6
(1924); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75;
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985); Pine, Speculation
and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 655 (1988); Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the
Supreme Cour 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236 (1983); Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial
Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988). These materials treat
constitutional fact-finding as separate from interpreting the Constitution. They begin
with the assumption that the Constitution's meaning is established (by way of the
traditional sources of interpretation) and then contemplate fact-finding using their
respective interpretations. I argue that fact-finding is itself an element of constitution-
al interpretation.
20 SeeJ. ELY, supra note 5, at 4-5.
21 See A. BICKEL (2d ed. 1986), supra note 5, at 16;J. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 10;
J. ELY, supra note 5, at 4-5; see also Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral
Principles, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 982,985 (1978) (revisiting Herbert Wechsler's "neutral
principles" thesis and "[a]ddressing the question of how determinations of courts
reviewing the actions of other branches of government can have legal quality even
though they inevitably involve choices of value"). But see Carter, The Right Questions
in the Creation of ConstitutionalMeaning 66 B.U.L. REV. 71, 72 (1986) ("I am uncon-
vinced that what might be termed effective judicial review-the production ofjudicial
decisions that work important changes in society-is necessarily counter-majoritar-
1991]
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primary quest of modern constitutional theory has been to identify
principles to set limits on the judiciary. 22 Although no constitu-
tional theorist today questions the legitimacy of judicial review,
every theorist's basic objective is to delineate the scope of the
Court's counter-majoritarian machinations. Constitutional theorists
use the traditional sources of interpretation-the text, original
intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and contemporary
values-to guide and criticize the Court. The Court, too, accepts the
need for extra-textual materials, and generally agrees with constitu-
tional theorists on which sources are legitimate.23 The sources of
constitutional interpretation thus provide authority for counter-
majoritarian decisions and also serve as restraining principles to
check possible counter-majoritarian excesses.
Facts guide and restrain constitutional interpretation in the
same way as the other elements of constitutional theory. Brute
reality restrains the Court. Historically, however, what could stand
for factual knowledge was expansive. Although the issue of whether
in 1824, "[a]ll America ... understood the word 'commerce[]' to
comprehend navigation" 24 was a factual matter, it was not one
known with very much certainty. Thus, facts, despite their capacity
to guide constitutional law-making, historically had little true
restraining effect on the Court. The Court could, and did, fashion
facts as it went along. Modern science, especially social science, has
begun to change the posture of fact-finding in constitutional theory.
Many constitutional facts are susceptible to "objective" verifica-
ian."); Griffin, What is Constitutional Theoiy? The Newer Theoty and the Decline of the
Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L. Rizv. 493, 506-10 (1989) (arguing that much constitu-
tional theory rests on outdated theories of democracy).
22 See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 399 (1985) ("In one way or
another, virtually every constitutional theorist deems it primarily important to address
the same question: where should we go in search of guiding principles for
interpreting the linguistically open-ended clauses of the Constitution." (footnote
omitted)). See generally Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theoy, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 383
(1985) (reviewing constitutional theories that attempt to resolve the dilemma inherent
in a system "which allows majorities to rule in wide areas oflife simply because they
are majorities, but which also holds that individuals have some freedoms that must
be exempt from majority control"); Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commentators:
The Principled, the Political and the Philosophica 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315,355-69
(1983) (observing that the greatest challenge for many modern constitutional
commentators is tojustify the rights and entitlements they would have the court read
into the Constitution).23 See Faigman, By What Authority? Reflections on The Constitutionality and Wisdom
of the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 353, 361 n.41 (1990).
24 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190.
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tion;25 and in those cases in which constitutional facts are ade-
quately tested, constitutional fact-finding should, and does, exert a
particularly strong restraining influence on the Court. Science
restrains the Court by making it accountable for the normative
judgments underlying its constitutionally based factual suppositions.
Yet, even a cursory inspection of the Court's constitutional cases
demonstrates an uneven use of empirical research.2 6  Some
commentators suggest that the Court's use of science is disingenu-
ous; these critics believe that the Court cites empirical research
when it fits the Court's particular needs, but eschews it when it does
not.27 Disingenuity, however, is not necessarily the explanation.
The principal reason for the Court's inconsistent use of science is
that it continues to approach factual questions as a matter of
normative legal judgment rather than as a separate inquiry aimed at
information gathering. The Court is not being disingenuous in its
manipulation of empirical research; rather, it is simply conducting
business as usual. Normative constitutional fact-finding, a phrase
2 1 It is important that I explain briefly what I mean by "objective." I have written
at some length elsewhere on this issue, see Faigman, supra note 14, at 1016-21, and
I return to it infra notes 107-22 & 289-90 and accompanying text. First of all, I am
not a "positivist" (nor am I a "witch" or a "communist"-accusations usually
announced in the same tone of voice)-at least to the extent that this term connotes
someone who believes that science can discover the one true reality. I use objective
not to refer to the identification of an "actual or absolute reality," but instead to refcr
to the identification of a "verifiable reality." The search for knowledge assumes many
forms, and science represents just one sort. Although an infinite number of "logically
possible worlds" may exist, as Sir Karl Popper stated, "the system called 'empirical
science' is intended to represent only one world: the 'real world' or the 'world of our
experience.'" K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 39 (1959).
2 6 See Appelbaum, The EmpircalJurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13
AM. J.L. & MED. 335 (1989); Kerr, Social Science and the U.S. Suprene Court, in THE
IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 56, 64-65 (M. Kaplan ed.
1986); Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and Policy, 10
LAW & POL. 167, 187-91 (1988). The most extensive analysis of the Supreme Court's
use of social science is P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
27 see, e.g., Kerr, supra note 26, at 64-65 ("A number of scholars of this topic had
concluded that social science evidence is only used in an opinion when it bolsters the
decision favored by the Justice on other grounds."); see also Bersoff, Psychologists and
the Judicial System, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 151, 155-56 (1986) ("[T]he relationship
between experimental psychologists and the courts is less than perfect. In fact, if that
relationship were to be examined by a Freudian, the analyst would no doubt conclude
that it is a highly neurotic, conflict-ridden ambivalent affair.... ."); Note, Sources of
Judicial Distrust of Social Science Evidende: A Conpaison of Social Science and
Jurisprudence, 64 IND. LJ. 755, 756 (1989) (observing that "[s]ome [legal scholars]
comment that even Supreme Court Justices mention social science evidence only
when that evidence 'bolsters a decision favored by the Justice on other grounds'"
(quoting Kerr, supra note 26, at 64-65)).
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seemingly a contradiction in terms, has been an inveterate compo-
nent of the constitutional tradition. But science, properly under-
stood, is not normative, and the Court misconstrues science by
treating it so. Nonetheless, even when the Court seems to ignore
empirical research, this research often significantly influences the
Court's jurisprudence.
This Article is divided into three sections. Section I examines
the structure of constitutional facts and contemplates their
significance with regard to constitutional meaning. Section I then
explores the historical relationship between constitutional fact-
finding and constitutional law-making, and examines the ways in
which the Court has framed the world to fit its interpretive
judgments. A review of several landmark nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases indicates the significance of fact-finding as
a source of constitutional law. Traditionally, constitutional fact-
finding served as a vehicle for the Court to reach normative
judgments in interpreting the Constitution. Fact-finding both
buttressed and substituted for the traditionally recognized sources
of constitutional authority. The Court regularly advanced facts, as
it did other authority, to establish the Constitution's meaning and
application. In contrast to its use of other authorities, however, the
early Court only rarely recognized any need to verify its factual
suppositions.
Increasingly, commentators and litigants are checking the
modern Court's fact-finding on the basis of empirical research that
only sometimes supports, and often contradicts, the Court's "best
guesses" about the world.. In some cases, the empirical data
indicates results contrary to the Justices' normative desires. Section
II explores the modern Court's struggle to fit science into the
interpretive enterprise. The Court uses empirical evidence in the
constitutional arena in essentially four ways: (1) by conforming its
conclusions to the available findings; (2) by claiming to follow the
import of empirical research, but misapplying the findings in
framing its conclusions; (3) by advancing its own conception of the
matter, misunderstanding or ignoring valid empirical research or
finding the empirical research inconclusive; and (4) by dismissing
the importance of the particular fact for its conclusion, relying
instead on some other ground or authority. There is much overlap
between these categories and, indeed, any attempt to categorize the
Court's handling of empirical data is to some extent misleading.
28
28 See Appelbaum, supra note 26, at 336. Appelbaum also had difficulty classifying
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These categories merely represent subcategories of a uniform
strategy the Court has adopted toward empirical evidence, what I
call normative constitutional fact-finding.
As the first two sections make clear, the Court historically relied,
and continues to rely, upon facts to guide its interpretation of the
Constitution. The final section explores how facts, especially when
supported by empirical data, also restrain the Court's discretion.
Compared with the traditional restraining principles, empirical
research fares extremely well in the task of curbing constitutional
discretion. Section III examines the main objection to this claim-
that the Court demonstrates an enormous facility in avoiding
inconvenient empirical research-a skill which seemingly belies
science's capacity to restrain. But in exercising this talent, the
Court is forced to attend to, and is made accountable for, the value
judgments underlying its factual jurisprudence.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL FACT: UNDER-
STANDING FACTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
The principles embodied in the Constitution have always been
defined by the empirical contexts enveloping the document's
words. 29 Facts having constitutional magnitude range widely, from
the effect of a railroad licensing requirement on interstate com-
merce3 ° to the nature of man.31 In the evolutionary develop-
ment of the Constitution, facts regularly established both the
context and the foundation for constitutional law. This section
the Court's handling of empirical research. He observed the following three possible
explanations to be found in the cases for the Court's empirical jurisprudence: the
Court might have (1) correctly understood the data and either used it or found it
deficient; (2) found the data, though valid, not legally sufficient; or (3) misunderstood
the data presented. See id. These categories roughly correspond to the categories I
choose for organizational purposes in Section II.29 justice Douglas observed this phenomenon, stating:
Those who have worked long with legal problems know that not all "law" is
to be found in books. There is much of it to be found in experience ....
One who reads a statute often needs more than a dictionary if he is to have
understanding. He needs insight into the nature of the organism with
which the statute deals. The problem is different only in degree when one
construes a Constitution written in general terms for an indefinite future.
Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 413 (1960).
5'See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
31 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (per curiam) (Stewart,J,
concurring) ("The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channel-
ing that instinct in the administration of criminaljustice serves an important purpose
in promoting the stability of a society governed by law.").
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examines first the types of facts in constitutional adjudication and
describes their interrelationship. Next, this Section surveys the
Court's use of fact-finding to shape the constitutional landscape in
several early cases.
A. The Configuration of Constitutional Facts
In a landmark article, Professor Kenneth Gulp Davis identified
two basic kinds of facts having evidentiary significance, legislative
facts and adjudicative facts.3 2 According to Davis, legislative facts
are those facts that transcend the particular dispute and have
relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.33
Judges are responsible for deciding questions of legislative fact.
Adjudicative facts, on the other hand, are those facts particular to
the dispute.34 Adjudicative facts are within the province of the
trier of fact (the jury or, if there is no jury, the judge) to decide.3 5
52 See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).
33 See FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory committee's note ("Legislative facts ... are
those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether
in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the
enactment of a legislative body.").
34 See id.; see also Davis, supra note 32, at 402 (noting that the rules of evidence for
finding facts which form the basis for creation of law and policy should differ from
the rules for finding facts specific to parties in a particular case).
35 Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker recently expanded upon the
Davis dichotomy by adding a third category which they call "social frameworks." See
Walker & Monahan, Social Framew,'orks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L.
REV. 559, 563-70 (1987). The term "social framework" refers to the use of general
conclusions from social science research in determining factual issues in specific
cases. See id. at 570. A social framework consists of facts which in part transcend the
particular dispute and in part pertain to that dispute. For example, a doctor might
be called upon to testify that cigarette smoking has been linked to lung cancer and
also be asked to testify that the plaintiff's lung cancer was caused by smoking
cigarettes. The former fact is like Davis's legislative facts and the latter is akin to his
adjudicative facts. Monahan and Walker argue that the judge should decide and
instruct the trier of fact regarding facts that transcend the litigation, and the jury
should hear evidence on the facts peculiar to the dispute. See id. at 592-96.
The social framework concept principally has evidentiary significance and would
fall within the constitutional-adjudicative category of the present analysis. See infra
note 36 and accompanying text. The Monahan and Walker thesis initiates a
significant debate over the role of the judge versus that of the jury in finding
adjudicative facts. Monahan and Walker would give the judge responsibility for
finding all facts that transcend the litigation, whether legislative or adjudicative. In
contrast, under both Davis's dichotomy and traditional rules of evidence, adjudicative
facts of general import are determined by thejury. In the constitutional context, the
gravity of this debate is magnified, a complication that will have to be left for another
time.
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Davis's dichotomy roughly represents the kind of fact-finding
that takes place in constitutional adjudication. His legislative fact
category, however, can be further refined in this context into two
subcategories, "constitutional-rule" facts and "constitutional-review"
facts. Constitutional-rule facts are advanced to substantiate a
particular interpretation of the Constitution. Constitutional-rule
facts join the traditional sources of authority-the text, original
intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and contemporary
values-in establishing the meaning of the Constitution. It is at this
level, in interpreting the mandates of the Constitution's words, that
the traditional sources of interpretation have been thought to
operate exclusively. In actuality, fact-finding serves a similar
function, as authority supporting the Court's construction of the
text. Constitutional-review facts, on the other hand, embody the more
generally recognized function of legislative fact-finding in constitu-
tional cases. Courts examine constitutional-review facts under the
pertinent constitutional rule in order to determine the constitution-
ality of the state's action. Finally, constitutional cases oftentimes
involve adjudicative facts-facts peculiar to the dispute and which
must be examined under the pertinent constitutional rule. 
6
An early case illustrating the two types of legislative fact-finding
in constitutional interpretation is McCulloch v. Maryland,37 in which
the Court, among other things, upheld Congress's power to
incorporate a national bank under the necessary and proper clause
of article I. McCulloch illustrates clearly how the Court employs
both constitutional-rule facts and constitutional-review facts when
reading the Constitution. Maryland had claimed that the word
"necessary" in the necessary and proper clause restricted the
government's power to those actions that were "indispensable" or
"absolutely necessary" to executing the powers granted under article
1.38 Marshall held that the clause did not limit Congress to only
"the most direct and simple" means to achieve legitimate ends.
3 9
Rather, he reasoned, "[t]o employ the means necessary to an end,
is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce
The classic modern example of constitutional-adjudicative facts can be found
in the obscenity cases. Under the Miller test, juries determine whether particular
materials are patently offensive or appeal to the prurient interest under local
community standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
37 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
-8 See id. at 367, 412-13.
39 See id. at 413.
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the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without
which the end would be entirely unattainable."
40
After his interpretation in McCulloch that the necessary and
proper clause contemplated "any means calculated to produce [a
legitimate] end,"41 Marshall still had to review the relevant facts to
determine whether the government's incorporation of the national
bank passed muster. Upon such review, Marshall concluded that the
bank incorporated by the government was an appropriate means by
which to pursue the legitimate ends enumerated in article 1.42
Marshall did not explain how he reached this conclusion. He might
be said to have provided his "best guess" about the facts in the
absence of sufficient evidence to demonstrate otherwise. 43 More
likely, Marshall "interpreted" the facts as part and parcel of his
blanket interpretation of the Constitution.
The significance of fact-finding to the process of constitutional
interpretation has two aspects. First, although the Court regularly
appeals to real world circumstances in shaping the constitutional
design,44 the Court readily maneuvers between the levels of
constitutional fact in crafting its opinions. In McCulloch, for
instance, Marshall's interpretation of the necessary and proper
clause cannot be separated from his conclusion that the bank was an
appropriate means by which to pursue the legitimate ends of article
I. The pertinent constitutional-rule fact (the general understanding
of "necessary") together with the pertinent constitutional-review fact
(that the national bank was an appropriate means to a legitimate
end) formed the final result. This synergy makes all three types of
constitutional fact-finding relevant to constitutional interpreta-
40 Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added). Marshall's appeal to the "general understand-
ing" of the word "necessary" parallels the rhetorical form of Gibbons v. Ogden in which
Marshall observed that "[a]ll America understands... 'commerce,' to comprehend
navigation," discussed supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
41 McCullocd, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14.
42 See id. at 424.
43 SeeJ. Monahan & L. Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers
19 (Aug. 1, 1990) (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
44 As Bikle notes:
[N]o court can undertake co decide upon the validity of legislation by a
mere comparison of its provisions with those of the applicable constitution,
but it must first be informed as to the truth of some question of fact which
the statute postulates or with reference to which it is to be applied ....
Bikle, supra note 19, at 6; see alro Karst, supra note 19, at 75 ("Whatever ajudge's
persuasion, he can decide a particular constitutional issue only by appraising the
factual basis for governmental action.").
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tion.45 Doubt cast on one level of constitutional fact can always be
compensated for by altering the analysis on another level. This
maneuverability has historically provided much interpretive
flexibility.
The second, and related, character of fact-finding in constitu-
tional interpretation follows from the mutual dependence of facts
and law in constitutional analysis.46 Advancing factual supposi-
tions can mean avoiding difficult legal judgments. Like the
connection between Ishmael and Queequeg when tied to the
monkey rope in Moby Dick, fact and law are wedded.4 7 The actions
45 Constitutional-adjudicative facts also are part of this synergy. See infra notes
242-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's transformation of the constitu-
tional query in McCleskey v. Kemp from concern over constitutional-review facts to
concern over constitutional-adjudicative facts).
4r The close connection between law and fact has frustrated many writers seeking
to distinguish between the two for purposes of allocating responsibility for legal
decision-making. For example, Professor Dickinson observed:
In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of fact"
really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and for
the good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two
mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-
matter. Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of
fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of law.
J. DICKINSON, ADMINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 55 (1927).
In this Article, the complication of allocating the power of decision-making is put
to one side. In general, when construing the Constitution,judges decide all pertinent
matters of law and fact (i.e., legislative fact), and thus the allocative issue is not
directly raised. Still, because constitutional-adjudicative facts are also implicated in
the Court's strategy of normative constitutional fact-finding, the question of allocating
these constitutional facts can not be ignored. See infra notes 242-68 and accompany-
ing text. See generally Monaghan, supra note 19, at 232-34 (noting that the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law often leads to confusion in judicial
opinions).47 As Ishmael chronicled in Moby Dick, "In the tumultuous business of cutting-in
and attending to a whale," the harpooner must often "remain on the whale till the
whole flensing or stripping operation is concluded." H. MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 270
(W.W. Norton & Co. ed. 1967). During this perilous task, Queequeg, the harpooner,
is tied to Ishmael, who is standing on the boat, by what is "called in the fishery a
monkey rope." Id. Every action of Ishmael's affects Queequeg; they are inextricably
linked. Ishmael describes the situation:
It was a humorously perilous business for both of us. For... the monkey-
rope was fast at both ends; fast to Queequeg's broad canvas belt, and fast
to my narrow leather one. So that for better or for worse, we two, for the
time, were wedded; and should poor Queequeg sink to rise no more, then
both usage and honor demanded, that instead of cutting the cord, it should
drag me down in his wake. So, then, an elongated Siamese ligature united
us. Qucequeg was my own inseparable twin brother; nor could I any way
get rid of the dangerous liabilities which the hempen bond entailed.
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taken on account of one inevitably touch the other. The ligature
uniting fact and law ultimately explains the former's influence on
constitutional meaning. In the following sections this connection
is explored, first as it existed in the past, and second how it
continues today.
B. Fact-finding in Historical Perspective
This section surveys several landmark nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases in order to illustrate the centrality of fact-
finding to understanding the Constitution's words. In these cases,
facts were not found to exist separately from the rhetorical argu-
ments supporting the outcome. Rather, facts were interwoven into
the constitutional fabric together with the traditional authorities of
interpretation. To be sure, the verisimilitude of constitutional facts
could not be ignored, but the value of fact-finding lay not in
accuracy but rather in persuasiveness. Fact-finding was one more
form of constitutional argument, used to shape and justify certain
outcomes.
1. Marbury v. Madison
The integral role fact-finding plays in ascertaining constitutional
principles can be traced' at least to Marbuy v. Madison,48 the
progenitor of judicial review, and thus, the basis for the Court's
modern normative responsibilities. The Marbury Court interpreted
the Constitution to mandate judicial review of legislative acts and,
indeed, believed that a different conclusion generated an untenable
paradox. According to ChiefJusticeJohn Marshall, the Constitution
forms "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation."49 It
follows that "[i]t is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it."50 It was
equally plain that the judiciary must be the ultimate arbiter of what
the Constitution says, for without judicial review the legislature
could "alter the constitution by an ordinary act."5 1  Marshall
explained:
Id. at 270-71.
48 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
49 Id. at 177.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinc-
tion, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they
are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal
obligation.
52
Judicial review rests, in large part, on a factual assumption.
Chief Justice Marshall implicitly assumed that legislators, though
they swear to discharge their duties pursuant to the Constitution,
would not always remain faithful to that pledge, or at least not as
faithful as judges.53  Since at that time no other constitutional
democracy in the world employed a system of judicial review of
legislative acts,54 this assumption may be questioned. 55
Even if legislators are not capable of fully upholding their oath
of office, what is the constitutional relevance of this observation?
The import of this observation ostensibly arises out of Marshall's
interpretation of the Constitution. But does the structure of the
Constitution mandate judicial review, as is demonstrated by the fact
that the legislature cannot be expected to restrain itself, or does the
52 Id. at 176-77.
53 Professor Fallon describes Marshall's assumption regarding the legislature's
behavior as "structural" and does not mention the empirical basis for the decision.
See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1201 n.48, To be sure, Marbuiy raises structural questions
involving the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. Still, the
resolution of this structural query requires certain empirical assumptions, as discussed
in the text.
" Mauro Cappelletti observes that "judicial review as a working method of
subordinating state action to higher principles was first effectively implemented in the
United States." M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 25
(1971) Cappelletti traces back to Athenian times the notion of a fundamental law
taking precedence over ordinary law. Despite subsequent Western philosophies
espousing a fundamental or higher law, however, the choice of who should interpret
that law varied considerably. See id. at 28-43. Although often endorsed in theory,
judges were not officially given that power until the rebellious American colonies
used it to force colonial laws to conform to English Parliamentary legislation. See id.
at 40. When the American revolution removed Parliament's authority and, later,
substituted the Constitution, the position ofjudges was institutionalized as well. See
id. at 41.
-9 A legal system withoutjudicial review is not difficult to envision. In England
today, judges do not have the authority to set aside acts of Parliament. See A.
MELONE & G. MACE, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 113 (1988). A
researcher interested in the validity of the factual assumption in Marbuty might very
well consider a comparative study of the American and English legal systems.
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fact that the legislature cannot restrain itself mandate a constitution-
al structure containing judicial review? If it had been, or could be,
conclusively demonstrated that the legislature is more capable than
the judiciary at saying "what the law is," would the Constitution still
mandate judicial review?56 Simply asking this question illustrates
the interrelationship between fact-finding and interpretation in
constitutional adjudication.
The function of fact in Marbuiy brings to mind the proverbial
chicken and egg riddle. The supposed fact that legislators can not
restrain themselves under a written Constitution has relevance only
because Marshall read the Constitution so as to raise the empirical
issue. At the same time, Marshall probably would not have read the
Constitution as raising this empirical issue if he had not already
anticipated the answer. Did the principle establish the relevance of
the fact or did the fact establish the principle? Marshall, it appears,
found the fact normatively and used it rhetorically in the same way
he used other external authority.
57
It is perhaps heretical to intimate that facts sometimes establish
the meaning of the Constitution. But facts qua facts never compel
a certain conclusion; the asserted facts, together with the other
authority explicitly or implicitly relied upon, were combined in
Marbuiy to establish the constitutional principle of judicial review.
The "correctness" of Marbury depends on the correctness of the
various premises of Marshall's argument, including the factual
supposition regarding legislators' self-discipline. The only true test
of the facts' import can come if the facts change, or they are
demonstrated to be different than the Court supposed.58
56 1 do not mean to suggest that this question is susceptible to certain proof.
Rarely will any question the Court posits be amenable to such proof, and some
questions are more amenable to research than others. Nonetheless, social science
might still provide some useful insights toward determining the validity of tile
supposition advanced in Marbuiy.57 See, e.g., Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("Certainly all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be,
that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.").58 This is a theme more directly pursued infra notes 291-309 and accompanying
text.
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2. Lochner v. New York and Muller v. Oregon
Resort to external development of the constitutional context
inevitably raises the spectre of Lochner v. New York 59 and the less
than salutary school of thought known as "substantive due process."
Indeed, Lochner presents an important example of the interplay
between fact and law in constitutional interpretation. Justice
Peckham, writing for the Court, invalidated a New York law
restricting the number of hours bakers could work on the ground
that the statute violated the parties' liberty of contract. Peckham
concluded that "[i]t is manifest to us that the [New York law] ...
has no such direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon
the health of the employ6, as to justify us in regarding the section
as really a health law." 60 The Court found liberty to contract to be
protected by the fourteenth amendment 6' and, upon considering
the pertinent constitutional-review facts, was not convinced that the
state had amply demonstrated the relationship between a baker's
hours and public health. 62 The Court's review of the relationship
existing between the New York law and the health of bakers was
necessitated by its reading of the fourteenth amendment. Using
contemporary terminology, the Court applied heightened scrutiny
to a statute which implicated a protected right.6 3 If no such right
had been identified, the Court would have had little occasion to
review the nexus between the New York law and public health. At
bottom, the Court's mistake, to the extent it made one, was in
59 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60 Id. at 64. In responding to a related argument of the state that the statute
furthered public health, the Court stated:
It was further urged ... that restricting the hours of labor in the case of
bakers was valid because it tended to cleanliness on the part of the workers,
as a man was more apt to be cleanly when not overworked .... In our
judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the connection between the
number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality
of the bread made by the workman.
Id. at 62.
61 See id. at 53.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 57-58. The Lochner opinion does not make clear whether the New
York statute failed a "rational basis" or a "compelling interest" review. Under
present-day standards it is clear that the Court either applied a rational basis test
incorrectly or applied heightened scrutiny to the law. Whichever is the case, the
Court substantively reviewed the validity of the statute, a practice for which it has
been criticized ever since.
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identifying the jight of liberty of contract in the fourteenth amendment.
In finding a constitutionally protected right to contract, the
Court was guided by its view of the nature of society, specifically, its
belief in the equality of bargaining power between employer and
employee. Justice Peckham was clear on the point:
We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this
law. On the contrary, we think that such a law as this, although
passed in the assumed exercise of the police power, and as relating
to the public health, or the health of the employds named, is not
within that power, and is invalid. The act is ... an illegal interfer-
ence with the rights of individuals, both employers and employds,
to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may
think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to
such contracts. Statutes of the nature of that under review,
limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor
to earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the
rights of the individual .... 64
The constitutional rule protecting liberty of contract found in the
fourteenth amendment thus stems from Peckham's understanding
of the factual circumstances surrounding the bargaining between
employer and employee. And under heightened scrutiny, the
constitutional-review facts failed to pass muster.
Lochner stands in apparent contrast to Muller v. Oregon,65 the
case generally associated with the onset of sociological jurispru-
dence 66 and, ironically, a case considered an exception to the early
twentieth century Court's substantive due process jurisprudence.
67
In Muller, the Court sustained against due process attack an Oregon
statute regulating the employment of women "in any mechanical
establishment, or factory, or laundry"68 for more than ten hours
in any one day. The Court ostensibly relied on the "factual" brief
submitted by Louis D. Brandeis which purportedly demonstrated
"the inherent difference between the two sexes." 69 Contrary to
64 Id. at 61.
65 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
6 S seeJ. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS
8-9 (2d ed. 1990).67 The irony of viewing Muller as an exception to the practice of substantive due
process lies in the Court's resort to the extra-judicial authority of the Brandeis Brief
to defer to the legislature's judgment. Today, applying the rational basis test, the
Court would not perceive any need to advance social science authority to support this
conclusion.
68 Muller, 208 U.S. at 416.
69 Id. at 423. See generally Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1958)
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Lochner, then, the state in Muller apparently satisfied its burden by
introducing sufficient constitutional-review facts to demonstrate a
significant state interest.
But Lochner and Muller cannot be reconciled simply on the basis
that in the latter the state met its burden, but in the former it did
not. Lochner and Muller are consistent in that they embrace a
similar theory of human relations, a theory made explicit in Lochner
but left unstated in Muller. This theory, generally associated with
Social Darwinism as popularized in the works of Herbert
Spencer, 70 dictated that freedom of contract was to be protected
against legislative intrusion except in certain categories of cases.
71
The Muller Court used the Brandeis Brief to uphold the statute
because the Court was already predisposed to that conclusion on
the basis of its factual suppositions regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment,72 rather than upon any review
of the state's factual showing in the case before it. Muller illustrates
the ease by which the Court can maneuver between constitutional-
rule facts and constitutional-review facts with a particular outcome
in mind. This attribute permits much jurisprudential flexibility.
The absence of a Brandeis Brief in Muller probably would not have
(heralding Brandeis's reliance on factual data as the start of a tradition of contextual-
ism, viewing legislation in the context of social conditions).70 See H. SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE (1892) [hereinafter H. SPENCER,
THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE]; H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (R. Schalkenbach ed.
1954) (1850) [hereinafter H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS].
71 Professor Tribe explains the point as follows:
[L]egislatures could properly enact statutes which protected the interests of
certain discrete groups, such as children and women, both treated by the
dominant legal ideology as unable to protect themselves .... But equaliza-
tion or redistribution of economic or social power, which "takes property
from A., and gives it to B.," was an impermissible end of legislation.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571-72 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).
72 Spencer's empiricism can hardly be deemed scientific and, indeed, is a fine
example of what I term "suppositional science." See infra note 110. Spencer's theory
is itself an admixture of fact and fancy and thus may be said to be only marginally a
matter of "fact-finding," as that term is used here. Nonetheless, at bottom, Spencer's
theory as employed by the Court in Lochner and Muller was "fact-based," especially to
the extent that the theory has a Darwinian component. See, e.g., H. SPENCER, THE
MAN VERSUS THE STATE, supra note 70, at 202 ("[Flor the healthful activity and due
proportioning of those industries ... which maintain and aid the life of a society,
there must.., be few restrictions on men's liberties to make agreements with one
another, and there must.., be an enforcement of the agreements which they do
make."); H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, supra note 70, at 55-56 ("Man exhibits just the
same adaptability [as plants and animals].... That such changes are towards fitness
for surrounding circumstances no one can question.").
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changed the result, nor would the presence of one have affected the
Lochner result.73 Both the Muller and Lochner Courts construed the
fourteenth amendment against the backdrop of a social reality
embraced by some at the time.74 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
in his Lochner dissent, captured the essence of the Court's method
in his customarily succinct fashion:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agreed with that theory, I should desire .to study it further and
long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be
my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagree-
ment has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
75
By rejecting the majority's constitutionalization of Spencer's
worldview, Holmes also rejected the substantive incorporation of
liberty of contract into the fourteenth amendment. Although
history has come to share Holmes's conclusion, some commentators
nonetheless continue to find the right of liberty of contract in the
Constitution without subscribing to Spencerian views.76 Informed
73 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Lochner, argued foremost that "[w]hether or not
this be wise legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire." 198 U.S. at 69
(Harlan,J., dissenting). But, he asserted, once "this inquiry is entered upon I find it
impossible, in view of common experience, to say that there is here no real or
substantial relation between the means employed by the State and the end sought to
be accomplished by its legislation." Id. Although the parties did not introduce a
"Brandeis Brief" to support such "common experience," Harlan cited and quoted at
length from empirical evidence purportedly demonstrating the dangerous conditions
present in bakeries. See id. at 70-71. Harlan, much as Brandeis would later do in
Muller, marshalled contemporary social science opinion and statistical reports to make
his case. This tactic was successful in Muller but not in Lochner.
74 Perhaps the most infamous example of this judicial myopia is Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which the Court found that the doctrine of
"separate but equal" provided blacks with the full and equal enjoyment of public
facilities. It is doubtful that the Court truly believed this factual statement. The
conditions of inequality were too pervasive for the Court to miss. Rather, what
guided the Court's hand were beliefs about other "facts" more firmly held, specifical-
ly, the then-prevalent "scientific" view doubting the wisdom of integration. See
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624. The
Plessy Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment depended as much on its
assumptions about the nature of blacks and their "place" in contemporary society as
on the legislative history of that amendment.
75 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).76 See Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 703
(1984); Kmiec & McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understand-
ing, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 525 (1987).. For a good critique of efforts to raise
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by a new vision of economics, generally associated with the
University of Chicago, 77 these commentators read the contract
clause broadly,78 urging either a "strict constructionist" interpreta-
tion of the clause 79 or "a return to the original understanding."
80
Whereas the Lochner Court read the Constitution by the flame of
the Spencerian lamp, modern commentators can reach the same
result by the incandescence of the Chicago-school lamp. The
Lochner Court's embrace of Spencer, therefore, was not necessary to
support the weight of its conclusion, though, to be sure, at the time
it served that seemingly important purpose.
Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent imploring the Court to set aside
its personal views in order to effectuate the proper interpretation
of the Constitution also can be challenged as a product of his
particular beliefs about human relations. Holmes, as perhaps the
first legal realist,81 openly embraced a fact-based jurisprudence as
indicated by his often-quoted statement: "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." 82 That Holmes discount-
ed the relevance of Herbert Spencer to deciding Lochner belies the
importance of extra-constitutional considerations to his conclusion.
The social milieu continually shaped Holmes's constitutional
jurisprudence.83  Holmes himself believed that all "rules of law
presuppose a certain state of facts to which they are applicable."
8 4
In fact, it has been argued that Holmes's Lochner dissent was shaped
by his own particular brand of Social Darwinism.8 5 Holmes's
Lochner from the grave, see Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process,
1987 Wis. L. REV. 265, 267 (concluding that "the costs of reviving economic
substantive due process still outweigh its benefits by a good margin").
77 See generally R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
78 The contract clause provides in pertinent part that "No State shall... pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.. .. " U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
79 See Epstein, supra note 76, at 728-29.
80 Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 76, at 526.
81 See e.g., White, From SociologicalJurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Centuiy America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1003-04 (1972)
(discussing Holmes's criticism in Lochner of thejudicial tendency to announce general
social propositions as truths, in ignorance of empirical proof).
82 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
83 See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Inten 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1894) ("[Law] has
become a conscious reaction upon itself of organized society knowingly seeking to
determine its own destinies."); see also T. MARVELL, supra note 11, at 150.
84 Holmes, Book Notices, 7 AM. L. REV. 318 (1873).
85 See generally Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 251 (1964)
(describing Holmes as a staunch adherent to Darwinian doctrines). Reflective of
Holmes's view is the following: "[I]f the will of the majority is unmistakable, and the
majority is strong enough to have a clear power to enforce its will, and intends to do
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advancement of the constitutional principle ofjudicial deference to
legislatures depended as much on his sociological and psychological
assumptions as any rationale he found in the text of the Constitu-
tion.
86
C. Conclusion
The Court's early history illustrates that fact-finding must
comprise a necessary and integral part of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Even when identifying what the Constitution says, facts arise
as part of the calculus. Moreover, once the meaning of the
Constitution has been established, factual questions abound in
applying these abstract principles to actual cases or controversies.
The early Court approached interpretation and fact-finding
interchangeably so that the values embodied by the Constitution
and the Court's factual understanding would combine to support a
particular result. In expounding the Constitution's mandates, the
Court identified and described the facts supporting the desired
outcome. Constitutional facts were only roughly based on empirical
reality; they existed in a nether world, somewhere within the
Constitution itself. As long as the Court was the only one in the
so, the courts must yield... because the foundation of sovereignty is power, real or
supposed." Holmes, Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 132, 141 (1871).
86 The most infamous example of Holmes's factualjurisprudence comes from his
opinion in Buck v. Bell in which the Court upheld a Virginia statute mandating in
certain cases "the sterilization of mental defectives." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205
(1927), overruled, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Although the holding
coincides with Holmes's long-standing philosophy of deferring to legislatures, the
opinion clearly embraces the core of the scientific theory of eugenics upon which the
legislation was based. See Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reforner"
Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 836 (1986).
Holmes's own words make the point:
In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific
findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the
grounds do not exist, and if they exist theyjustify the result. We have seen
more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is beiter for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough
to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.
Bell 274 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted).
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business of finding these facts, this style of interpretation could
continue.
Today, many researchers challenge the Court's constitutional
fact-finding. The Court continues to view constitutional facts
normatively, casually interweaving the values the Constitution
embodies with the facts as the Court defines them. This practice,
however, has come into conflict with the increasingly precise
techniques of empirical inquiry. The next section examines how the
Court has responded to the researchers' challenge.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FACT AND SCIENTIFIC FACT:
WHETHER THE TwAiN SHALL MEET
87
Facts continue to be central to the modern Court's88 explica-
tion of the Constitution, and the Court also continues to shape the
facts to fit its judgments. Increasingly, however, scientists have
begun to challenge the Court's vision of reality and thus the
respective constitutional principles attached to that vision. The
Justices have employed various strategies to cope with empirical
data, both when the data support a holding and when they do not.
Their responses range from open reliance on research to open
disdain for it. Whatever its response to the data in a particular case,
however, the modern Court has closely adhered to the tradition of
normative constitutional fact-finding.
A. When the Court Heeds Empirical Research
Occasionally, the Court fashions its constitutional decisions in
accordance with the contemporary consensus of scientific opinion.
The two cases which best exemplify this practice are also the cases
which have led the Court to avoid it. By far the most notorious use
of social science in constitutional law is footnote 11 of Brown v.
Board of Education,8 9 and the most notorious use of biological
87 The phrase is Rudyard Kipling's: "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and
never the twain shall meet." Kipling, The Ballad of East and Wes4 in COLLECTED
VERSES OF RUDYARD KIPLING 136 (1915).
88 1 concur with Professor Perry who fixes "the modern period of American
constitutional law to be the period since Brown v. Board of Education." Perry, supra
note 3, at 552-53 n.5. Conveniently, Brown also marks the modern era of the Court's
explicit use of social science in constitutional law. See infra note 92 and accompany-
ing text.
89 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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science in constitutional law is Roe v. Wade.90 In both cases, the
Court seemingly crafted its opinions in light of scientific consensus,
and in both instances the Court lost credibility in doing so.
1. Brown v. Board of Education
In Brown v. Board of Education the Court cited a series of studies
conducted by Dr. Kenneth Clark and others to support its finding
that segregation of blacks "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."91 The Brown Court's appar-
ent reliance on social science, applauded by some as marking the
inception of the modern era of cooperation between social science
and law,92 has been criticized by others who fear the consequences
of such interdisciplinary cooperation. 93 Still others question how
much impact the research had on the Court's decision. 94 In
retrospect, it seems clear that the studies were not necessary to the
holding and indeed, at the time, Chief Justice Earl Warren is
reputed to have responded to the controversy surrounding the
citation to the studies by saying, "It was only a note, after all."
95
go 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
92 See, e.g., P. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 157 ("The Court's use of social science in
the Brown case confirmed the success of efforts ... to have constitutional law
propounded in the light of reliable extra legal data rather than of arbitrary judicial
biases."). See generally Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining Evaluating and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 483-84 (1986) (noting the
Brown Court's acceptance of empirical research as fact).
93 See e.g., Berger, Desegregation, Law, and Social Science, 23 COMMENTARY 471,476
(1957) ("[W]e may reach a point where we shall be entitled to equality under law only
when we can show that inequality has been or would be harmful."); Cahn,Jurispu-
dence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 157-58 (1955) ("I would not have the constitutional
rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on anysuch flimsy foundation as some
of the scientific demonstrations in these records."); O'Brien, Of Judicial Myths,
Motivations andJustfications: A Postscript on Social Science and the Law, 64JUDICATURE
285, 289 (1981) (arguing that constitutional standards should not rest on the most
recent public opinion survey).
94 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 13. Bork asserts:
It has long been obvious that [Brown] does not rest upon the grounds
advanced in ChiefJustice Warren's opinion, the specially harmful effects of
enf6rced school segregation upon black children. That much ... is made
plain by the per curiam decisions that followed outlawing segregated public
beaches, public golf courses and the like.
Id.
95 R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1976).
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The question presented, therefore, is why did the Brown Court
believe it helpful to rely on social science in any measure, rather
than the "bedrock of a coherent constitutional principle"?96 The
simple explanation, it would seem, is that the equal protection
clause, as interpreted by the Court, raises an empirical question.
The Court understood the fourteenth amendment as presenting the
question of whether "segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race ... deprive[s] the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities."97  Relevant to this
inquiry was the "feeling of inferiority"98 segregation instilled and
the detrimental effects engendered by segregation. These are
empirical questions and, however obvious the answers might seem
today, social science was pertinent to the inquiry. But this "simple
explanation" still does not reveal why the Court read the fourteenth
amendment as raising an empirical question in the first place.
99
A less simple and more intriguing explanation for why the Court
relied on social science rather than "the bedrock of a coherent
constitutional principle" comes from recognition of the difficulty in
choosing which constitutional principle to rely upon. Many
commentators have offered alternative bases for deciding Brown the
way the Warren Court did, but few agree on any single basis.
100
Of the five traditional principles of constitutional adjudication,
none squarely supports the decision and several indicate a contrary
result. The text of the fourteenth amendment is, at best, ambiguous
96 Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used injudicialDecisioninaking? 6J.L. & EDuc.
13, 18 (1977) ("We would pose a greater danger to our 200 year experience in
constitutional interpretation if we were to rest constitutional interpretation on social
science data rather than on the bedrock of a coherent constitutional principle.").9 7 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
98 Id. at 494.
99 Another explanation, that the empirical question had been raised in the Court's
precedent, is discussed infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
10 ) See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 381-92 (1986). Dworkin's theory on Brown
is outlined infra note 121. Virtually all constitutional theorists deem it necessary to
provide a plausible account of Brown. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 5, at 32-33
(advancing the ninth amendment as the appropriate repository for the rights
vindicated in Brown); Bork, supra note 9, at 14-15 (arguing that the fourteenth
amendment "was intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against govern-
mental discrimination," which, if applied neutrally, would outlaw public school
segregation); Brest, supra note 2, at 232-33 ("The main issue facing the Court was
whether policies of federalism made it inapposite to impose on one government
constraints that the Constitution placed on the other."); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 33
("[Brown] rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of
equality to the minority against whom it is directed.").
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on the matter,10 1 and the Brown result appears contrary to the
framers' original intent.10 2 Although the pertinent precedent
evidences a slow movement toward the Brown result,10 3 Plessy v.
Ferguson10 4 remained the law in 1954. Moreover, at the time,
constitutional scholarship divided on the proper outcome,10 5 and
contemporary values in 1954 did not wholly support the deci-
sion.10 6 Given the shortcomings of the traditional supporting
principles, the Court not surprisingly embraced the venerable
interpretive principle of constitutional fact-finding to support its
ruling.
Professor Ronald Dworkin argues that despite the empirical
nature of the questions raised in Brown, the empirical studies were
irrelevant to answering these questions. Beginning with a premise
from another commentator, Professor Dworkin argues:
"We don't need evidence for the proposition that segregation is an
insult to the Black community-we know it; we know it the way we
know that a cold causes snuffles." It is not that we don't need to
101 See R. BERGER, supra note 9, at 99-116.
102 See id. at 117-33; A. BICKEL (2d ed. 1986), supra note 5, at 58-59.
103 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the equal
protection clause requires admission of black students to the University of Texas Law
School when such education is not otherwise available to them as provided by the
state); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) ("Appellant,
having been admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must receive the same
treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races.").
104 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
105 See R. BERGER, supra note 9, at 117-33. Compare Note, Is Racial Segregation
Consistent with Equal Protection of the Laws? Plessy v. Ferguson Reexamined, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 629 (1949) (arguing that segregation violated the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection) and Note, Segregation in Public Schools-A Violation of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 56 YALE LJ. 1059 (1947) (same) with Crawford,
Segregation Without Discrimination, 11 GA. BJ. 81 (1948) (arguing that segregation was
not violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment) and Harris,
The Fourteenth Amendment 10 GA. BJ. 346 (1948) (same) and Note, Racial Segregation
and the Separate But Equal Doctrine 26 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 81 (1950) (same).
106 A Gallup poll conducted shortly after the decision found that nationwide only
54 percent of the respondents supported the Brown result. GALLUP REPORT No. 185,
at 25 (Feb. 1981). Not surprisingly, approval percentages were far lower among
whites in the South (16 percent) and, perhaps more surprisingly, about the same
among southern blacks (53 percent). See id. See generally Murphy, Can Public Schools
Be "Private"?, 7 ALA. L. REV. 48 (1954) (examining the constitutionality of various
proposed measures intended to circumvent Brown); Note, Segregation in Education, 34
B.U.L. REv. 463,475-78 (1954) (summarizing early reactions to Brown throughout the
United States); Note, Implementation of Desegregation by the Lower Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 486 (1958) (assessing the difficulties and delays likely to be experienced by
plaintiffs seeking enforcement of Brown in lower courts).
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know it nor that there isn't something there to know. There is a
fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an insult, but we
need no evidence for that fact-we just know it. It's an interpretive
fact.'
0 7
Dworkin's use of the term "interpretive fact" apparently
encapsulates two separate arguments. First, Dworkin believes that
the social sciences are not sufficiently valid to support constitutional
rulings.' 0 8 I have responded to this contention in a previous
article.10 9 Suffice it to say, here, that I agree that very often social
science research is not valid (what I call "suppositional
science");'1 0 sometimes, however, social science research is valid,
in theory it can be valid, and even when it has not been scientifically
demonstrated to be valid, it is not wholly without relevance. A
related and more important aspect of Dworkin's contention is that
even assuming some validity for the available data, important
constitutional matters should not rest on factual bases alone.
111
Dworkin posits a legal theory he calls "creative" or "construc-
tive" interpretation, analogizing the legal-interpretive process to
writing the latest chapter of a chain novel.11 2 The interpreter fits
her interpretations into the prior chapters and, at the same time,
extends the overall work in the "best possible" direction. 113 The
theory contemplates first that the interpreter identify the "fit"
between the interpretive history and the practice being interpreted
and, second, that the interpreter impose a "purpose on an object or
107 Dworkin, Social Sciences and ConstitutionalRights-The Consequences of Uncertainty,
6J.L. & EDUC. 3, 5 (1977) (quoting Cahn, supra note 93, at 157-68) (emphasis added).
108 See id. ("While in physics it is now thought to be an unsound judgment that
rests merely on correlation between observable events unsupported by some notion
of the mechanics that translate the cause to the effect, social science is only able to
provide correlations without the mechanics.").
109 See Faigman, supra note 14, at 1010-11.
110 Id. at 1052. The term "suppositional science"
refers to two types of'findings' advanced by social researchers: first, those
that on their face are untestable or have not been tested in any fashion
whatsoever; and second, those that assume the veneer of science (i.e., are
forwarded as fully tested propositions) but have yet to be tested adequately.
Id.
111 See Dworkin,supra note 107, at 4-5, 12 (distinguishingbetween causal facts and
interpretive facts and arguing that only the latter are properly a part of constitutional
decision-making).
112 See Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 540-46 (1982). For an
analysis of the chain novel metaphor, see Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Inteipreta-
tion in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 551 (1982).
11 See Dworkin, supra note 112, at 541-42.
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practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the
form or genre to which it is taken to belong." 114 The difficulty
for the present discussion lies in understanding the role for science
in this legal-interpretive discourse. Dworkin distinguishes scientific
interpretation from legal interpretation, for in the former the data
can be said to "speak to" the scientist only metaphorically, and it is
not helpful to impose a purpose onto the data. 115  Still, when
incorporating scientific interpretations into legal interpretations the
proper fit must be ascertained and the value component inherent
in the idea of purpose returns to the equation. But how should
scientific interpretation be combined with legal interpretation?
Unfortunately, Dworkin has not written specifically on this problem.
There is no necessary fallacy in using data responsive to an
empirical question whose relevance depends on its "fit" with the
practice being interpreted and which comports with a legal
conclusion that "make[s] of it the best possible example of the form
or genre to which it is taken to belong." In Brown, for example, the
issue of segregation's effects had been an integral component of the
preceding interpretive tradition. In Plessy v. Ferguson,11 6 for
instance, the Court assumed that the "separate but equal" doctrine
provided blacks with the full and equal enjoyment of public
facilities1 17 and, further, that any feelings of inferiority resulted
"solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it."118 Hence, the research cited in Brown "fit" into the
interpretive tradition of querying the effects of segregation.
Moreover, extending this tradition in the "best possible" fashion
should involve taking into account the best available research
illuminating the pertinent facts. 119 As Dworkin admits, there is
114 R. DWORKIN, supra note 100, at 52.
115 See id. at 51.
116 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overuled, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117 See id. at 544.
118 Id. at 551.
119 Substantial questions abound concerning the validity of the research reported
in Brown, with most commentators agreeing that it suffered from significant method-
ological and interpretive flaws. See Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation: Did
We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 420 (1979);
Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science Role, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 869 (1983);
van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69,77 (1960). Still, the relevance of the factual inquiry
must be kept distinct from the availability of valid data to answer the inquiry. Neither
the lack of data nor the availability of data should affect the relevance of some fact
to constitutional analysis.
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a fact of the matter.12 ° Whether that fact has interpretive signifi-
cance is a separate issue.
121
Some of the confusion here might arise out of the meaning of
the word "fact." We may know, as Dworkin argues we should know
"interpretively," "that a cold causes snuffles." But surely, if the
"interpretive" judgment is accurate, valid scientific studies should
corroborate that judgment.122 Science is not irrelevant for dem-
120 See supra text accompanying note 107.
121 In the final analysis, Dworkin does not believe that black children's self-esteem
is relevant to the proper interpretation of Brown at all. Dworkin provides his
approach to decidingBrown in Law's Empire, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 100, through
the voice of the omniscientJustice Hercules. Hercules "constructs three accounts of
a right against racial discrimination." Id. at 382. The first principle, "suspect
classifications," contemplates that distinctions according to race that work to the
disadvantage of the respective group "be viewed with special suspicion." Id. at 383.
But under this principle, the state could demonstrate circumstances that justify the
discrimination. See id. The second principle, "banned categories," maintains that the
Constitution recognizes a right that "certain properties or categories ... not be used
to distinguish groups of citizens for different treatment." Id. at 384. "A racially
segregated school system is, on this account, unconstitutional under all circum-
stances." Id. The third principle, "banned sources," "insists that preferences that are
rooted in some form of prejudice against one group can never count in favor of a
policy that includes the disadvantage of that group." Id. Hercules rejects the first
account, "suspect classifications," as inconsistent with modern conceptions of fairness.
See id. at 387. He finds that the second and third accounts come to the same result
(i.e., they both "condemn officially sponsored racial segregation in schools"), and,
thus, he does not have to choose one over the other. See id. at 388. Hercules
concludes:
The plaintiff schoolchildren are being cheated of what their Constitution,
properly interpreted, defines as independent and equal standing in the
republic; this is an insult that must be recognized and removed.... Racially
segregated public schools do not treat black schoolchildren as equals under
any competent interpretation of the rights the Fourteenth Amendment
deploys in the name of racial equality, and official segregation is therefore
unconstitutional.
Id. at 389.
122 My "faith" in the possibility or utility of scientific corroboration of Dworkin's
interpretive facts will be challenged in some quarters. Recently, a classic debate has
resurfaced over the objectiveness of social science research. At one pole of this
debate stand some adherents of critical legal studies who assert the wholly subjective
character of all knowledge. See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 64-
65 (1987); R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989). A related, and
for present purposes equivalent, view is the hermeneutic tradition which rejects any
extension of the natural science model of general empirical laws to the realm of
human behavior. SeeJ. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 148 (1971).
On the opposite pole might be the "positivists" who entertain the notion that some
absolute reality can be identified empirically, be it natural or social. (No cite is
available because no one these days claims to be, or admits to being, a positivist. See
R. MILLER, FACT AND METHOD: EXPLANATION, CONFIRMATION AND REALITY IN THE
NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 (1987)). Most commentators fall somewhere
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onstrating what everyone believes to be the case, though courts
might wish to relegate studies corroborating the relationship
between a cold and snuffles to a footnote. And, to our surprise, it
might turn out that some malady only associated with colds causes
snuffles, and that we were wrong the whole time. Certainly
researchers should not be discouraged from looking into the
question on the basis thai: we know it to be true because we know
it to be true.
Knowledge of reality, as a principle of constitutional interpreta-
tion, does not create the difficulties Dworkin identifies. Indeed, it
is impossible to conceive of constitutional interpretation without a
factual component. Interpretive facts are facts permeated with
values only because the Court does not expend sufficient energy
separating one from the other. The tension created by scientific
fact-finding arises out of languid development of the other princi-
ples of interpretation. The Court relies on "interpretive facts,"
instead of "real facts," because the Court is not otherwise interpret-
ing very well.
between these two extremes and accept some role for empirical research in legal
discourse. The debate involves the extent to which social researchers' value orienta-
tions and individual perspectives color their data as well as the conclusions they draw
from their data. Closer to the positivist pole are those who embrace some form of
traditional empiricism, those who, like myself, might be labeled scientific realists. See,
e.g., Faigman, supra note 14, at 1014 n.22 (identifying "scientific realism" as the
epistemological foundation for many of the views expressed in the Article); Monahan
& Walker, supra note 92, at 493-99 (articulating a framework in which courts can
assess both the validity and relevance of empirical research). Closer to the herme-
neutic tradition are those who advance what they call a "critical empiricism." See, e.g.,
Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575
(1984) (calling for the adoption of a "critical empiricism" in legal scholarship); Trubek
& Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's
Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3 (1989) (defining, analyzing, and explaining "critical
empiricism"). Interestingly, Trubek and Esser refer to critical empiricism as marking
the "beginnings of a new 'interpretive' paradigm for law and society [research]." Esser
& Trubek, From "Scientism Without Detenninisn" to "Inteipretation Without Politics": A
Reply to Sara4 Ha"ington and Yngvesson, 15 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 171, 171 (1990)
(emphasis added). As this Article seeks to demonstrate, much of the Court's
empirical jurisprudence might be said to be in accord with Trubek's interpretive
paradigm. See Trubek, supra, at 603-04. TheJustices, however, would probably object
to being characterized as "critical empiricists" or, for that matter, the alternative
description of the "hermeneutic Supreme Court." I return to the issue of the
objectiveness of science infra text accompanying notes 287-89.
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2. Roe v. Wade
A seemingly notable exception to the phenomenon of normative
constitutional fact-finding is Roe v. Wade,23 in which Justice
Blackmun constructed the constitutional framework for a woman's
fundamental right to choose an abortion free of state interference
"in the light of present medical knowledge." 124 Blackmun assert-
ed that the state's "compelling" interest in the health of the mother
begins at the end of the first trimester. He explained: "This is so
because of the now-established medical fact [that] until the end of
the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality
in normal childbirth."1 25  Blackmun ruled further that "[w]ith
respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the 'compelling' point is at viability."12 6 He explained: "This
is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb."1 27 Medical science,
therefore, delineates the two junctures during a pregnancy-at the
time mortality in abortion is no longer less than mortality at
childbirth and at viability-when the state's compelling interests
arise. The Roe Court's reliance upon modern science was met with
vehement criticism, wholly separate from the criticism directed at
the value choices driving the majority's opinion.
1 28
Critics complain that attaching constitutional meaning to
scientific opinion, even when scientists are in consensus, condemns
the Constitution to fluctuations in meaning as scientific knowledge
changes. 12 9 The principal proponent of this view has been Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,1' ° Justice O'Connor warned that, due to recent advances
in medicine, linking the constitutional framework in Roe to medical
technology has set it "on a collision course with itself."13 ' Since
123 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124 Id. at 163.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See Ely, The Wages of Ciying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 941 (1973) (criticizing the Court's holding that abortion is a fundamental right
entitled to strict scrutiny review); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 184-85 (same).
129 See generally Rhoden, Tiiinesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95
YALE LJ. 639, 648-55 (1986) (arguing that the Court should abandon the trimester
analysis).
130 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
I Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Roe, abortion has become safer than childbirth through approxi-
mately week sixteen, and the time of viability has become progres-
sively earlier with advancing technology. 32 Yet, the Akron Court
rejected the suggestion that changes in technology mandate
postponement of the state's interest in maternal health from the
twelfth week to the sixteenth week, as long as first trimester
abortions remain safer than second trimester abortions.13 3  In
contrast, the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
1 34
heeded the changing technological landscape in ruling that the state
could require viability assessments prior to the third trimester.
Moreover, the Webster Court derided the constant judicial backing
and filling necessitated by the adoption of the trimester framework,
calling this area of the law "a virtual Procrustean bed.
" 13 5
Yet, Blackmun's error in Roe does not come from attaching the
fundamental right of choice to empirical fact, but rather from
failing to sufficiently articulate the constitutional principles
underlying that right.' 36  Blackmun never explained why the
Constitution mandates the use of a scientific standard. 3 7 Black-
mun affixed the state's compelling interest in maternal health at the
point in time when abortion was safer than childbirth. In 1973 this
time was conveniently at the end of the first trimester. If this
principle were constitutionally mandated then, as abortion becomes
safer, the state's interest should be postponed accordingly.
Similarly, if viability is the constitutionally mandated instant when
the state's interest in potential life comes into being, then as
132 See Brief of the American Medical Association et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellees, at 5, 10, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(No. 88-605). Contrary to Justice O'Connor's observation, however, advancing
medical technology probably will never result in the total collapse of the trimester
scheme, because the onset of viability is not expected to advance much beyond the
present 23-24 weeks. See id. at 5-8.
133 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.11.
134 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989).
135 Id. at 3056.
136 See Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-
Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 168-69 (1984). Professor Tribe argues that
science should not be relied upon in constitutional law-making because it tends to
"flatten issues, to squeeze the living complexity out of them." Id. at 161. Using
science, however, does not inevitably renderjustices blind to the normative principles
at stake. True, the Court has used science as though this were the case. But valid
science should not be eschewed because it has been mishandled. The challenge is to
use science to clarify, not substitute for, the difficult normative issues at stake. See
infra notes 270-309 and accompanying text.
137 See Tribe, supra note 136, at 168-69.
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viability occurs earlier, the state's interest should advance according-
Ty.
But the Court has skirted the issue of what constitutional values
are implicated in this area. In regard to the constitutional relevance
of viability, for example, Blackmun stated: "With respect to the
State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb." 138 As John Hart Ely pointed out, this argument
"seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism." 13 9 The juncture
of viability does not have independent constitutional significance,
at least insofar as it lacks an explicit constitutional value to support
it. Certainly viability, as well as the risks associated with abortion
that establish the constitutional relevance of the first trimester, are
the sorts of interests necessary to any constitutional calculation
establishing the woman's rights against the state's interests. These
interests, however, are not the only ones at stake and, as the Court's
subsequent jurisprudence makes plain, every time these factors
fluctuate the Court must recalculate the equation. Using the
trimester framework, the Court finesses the perhaps intractable
problem of expounding the many conflicting principles and value
choices comprising the fundamental right of privacy in the abortion
context. Medical science simply serves as a convenient proxy for
this task.
140
The error undermining the trimester framework, as well as the
shallowness of the Court's constitutional-scientific jurisprudence,
can be seen clearly in Akron, in which the Court refused to abandon
the scheme even when the facts demonstrated its continuing
inapplicability. The change in the statistics of maternal health
indicating the greater safety of the abortion procedure compared to
childbirth through week sixteen did not prompt a corresponding
change in the onset of the state's interest. The Court insisted that
the "trimester standard... continues to provide a reasonable legal
138 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
139 Ely, supra note 128, at 924.
140 See Rhoden, supra note 129, at 643. Rhoden notes:
The abortion framework in Roe had... important underpinnings that were
not articulated explicitly-mainly, the assumption that a viable fetus was one
that was substantially developed and had reached 'late' gestation, and the
ethical precept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective
abortion can be forbidden.
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framework for limiting a State's authority to regulate abortions."
141
With one stroke of the pen, the Court turned the trimester
framework, a framework whose original cogency rested on a
scientific basis, into a rule whose cogency rests on a still unarticulat-
ed normative basis. The Court thus changed what were empirically
testable facts into constitutionally mandated value judgments.
Ironically, the dissenters in Webster, proponents of the continuing
use of the trimester framework, criticized the plurality for failing to
engage in a "great issues" debate over the right of privacy in the
abortion context. 142  But the entire Court has so far failed to
engage in such a debate, and as the structure of the Court's
scientific whitewashing breaks down, this becomes more clearly
evident.
The Court's transformation of the trimester framework from a
factual matter into a legal imperative clearly illustrates its general
approach to scientific research. But Roe was extraordinary in many
respects, primarily in that the Court originally applied the scientific
evidence correctly. No: until subsequent cases, together with
subsequent technology, began splitting the trimester framework at
the seams did the Court abandon science for more familiar ground.
A principal error in Roe rests in Blackmun's failure to realize that
the technological premises of the rule would change over time. Not
all science should prove so unreliable as a basis for constitutional
decision-making. Nonetheless, even in areas in which science might
be expected to remain stable, the Court has failed to change course
141 Akron, 462 U.S. at 429 n.1 1 (emphasis added); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 278-79 (1984). In Schal; Justice Rehnquist noted the argument "that it is
virtually impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy,"
but, nonetheless, argued:
Our cases indicate ... that from a legal point of view there is nothing
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such
a judgment forms an important element in many decisions, and we have
specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological
data relied upon by appellees and the District Court, "that it is impossible
to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be
meaningless."
Id. (emphasis added and footnote omitted) (quotingJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,274
(1976)); see also infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text (discussingJustice White's
similar inability in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), to accept data indicating
the invalidity of predictions of dangerousness, because of contrary precedent).
142 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3072 n.7 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also id. at 3057-58
(answering the dissenters by asserting that it is appropriate to challenge the Roe
constitutional framework without engaging in a debate over the existence of a
"fundamental right" to an abortion).
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in light of new scientific knowledge. Very often, the Court simply
integrates new but conflicting findings into its former interpreta-
tions, ironing out any wrinkles by ignoring or misapplying the ill-
fitting scientific data. The next section explores a case in which the
Court ostensibly followed scientific findings, but, in actuality,
misapplied the research in order to support the desired outcome.
B. When the Court Misapplies Empirical Research: Ballew v. Georgia
The Court's use of scientific evidence in constitutional law
cannot be assessed without consideringJustice Blackmun's contribu-
tions to the subject. 143 In comparison to his fellow Justices,
Blackmun stands alone in encouraging scientists to participate in
the legal process and in relying on empirical research in his
constitutional opinions. In fact, however, Blackmun differs from his
colleagues only in degree in his manipulation of empirical research
for normative ends. The previous section's examination of Roe v.
Wade exemplified, in part, Blackmun's timidity in following science
wherever it might lead. This section explores Ballew v. Georgia, 1
44
which probably contains the most extensive use of empirical
research to be found in a Supreme Court opinion.
The Court in Ballew returned to the question of the constitution-
al relevance of jury size, which it first visited in Williams v. Flori-
da.145  Williams upheld the constitutionality of six-person juries
in criminal cases, except capital cases, where juries of twelve are
constitutionally mandated. 146 The Williams Court refrained from
specifying the minimum number ofjurors required by the Constitu-
tion, but observed that
the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participa-
tion and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role
is not a function of the particular number of the body that makes
14s See generally Schlesinger & Nesse, Justice Hary Blackmun and Empirical
Jurisprudence, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 405, 406 (1980) (noting that Blackmun's use of
scientific data in the formulation of his legal opinions illustrates the advantages and
limitations of an "empirical-statistical approach to jurisprudence").
144 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
145 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
146 See id. at 102-03; see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (holding that
a federal district court rule providing for six-person juries in civil cases does not
violate the seventh amendment's guarantee of trial by jury).
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up the jury. _To be sure, the number should probably be large
enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at
intimidation, and to provide afairpossibilityfor obtaining a representa-
tive cross-section of the community.
14 7
In the approximately eight years between Williams and Ballew,
social scientists conducted numerous studies examining the
empirical questions raised by the Williams Court concerning,
specifically, the effect of size on ajury's deliberations and represen-
tativeness of the community. In an opinion that has been likened
to a social science article,L48 Blackmun surveyed the multitude of
studies conducted since Williams in order to determine whether
Georgia's prosecution of Ballew before a five-member jury violated
the sixth amendment. Blackmun wrote that "these studies. . . lead
us to conclude that the purpose and functioning of the jury in a
criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree,
by a reduction in size to below six members."
149
In a thorough review of the jury size cases, Professor David Kaye
argues that Blackmun's conclusion is not supported by the social
science literature and, indeed, that his "treatment of the statistical
literature is, at best, careless ... .150 Kaye demonstrates convinc-
ingly that the literature does not support the line drawn between
six- and five-member panels. In fact, Kaye argues that the literature
supports retention of the twelve-member scheme rejected in
Williams,151 observing that "fixing the line at the point marked by
Williams... has the appearance of expediency rather than princi-
ple."152  Moreover, Kaye states that Ballew's "reaffirmance[] of
Williams represent[s] judicial intransigence-a willful disregard or
cynical distortion of the writings of social scientists.
" 153
Kaye's trenchant criticisms assume that Williams should have
been on the table for reconsideration. The Court, however,
147 Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).
148 See Grofman & Scarrow, Mathematics, Social Science, and the Law, in THE
UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 117,121 (M. Saks
& C. Baron eds. 1980).
149 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239.
1 50 Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning the Supreme Cour and
the Size of theJuiy, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1004, 1008 (1980). But see Grafman & Scarrow,
supra note 148, at 121 (describing Blackmun's Ballew opinion as "good social science").
151 See Kaye, supra note 150, at 1032.
152 Id.; see also Sperlich,. .. And Then There Were Six: The Decline of the Anerican
Juy, 63 JUDICATURE 262, 275-79 (1980) (suggesting that certain "hidden agendas"
motivated the Court's decision).
153 Kaye, supra note 150, at 1032.
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operated from an altogether different premise. The constitutional
question presented in Ballew concerned where to draw the line given
the Court's earlier decision to uphold panels of fewer than twelve
members.15 4 The social science studies available to the Court had
little relevance to this question-none of the studies compared five-
member panels to six-member panels.1 55 Although Blackmun cast
the social science research as responsive to the main issue, in reality,
he used it heuristically to answer a different question than the
scientists had researched. Blackmun "interpreted" the studies
against the backdrop of the Court's decision in Williams. The Court
thus integrated its fact-finding into the existing constitutional
mosaic, a strategy that required reconciling the pertinent facts with
other principles of constitutional theory, most notably precedent.
If Blackmun had used the studies properly, that is, to support a
constitutional requirement of twelve-member juries in criminal
cases, he would not have written the opinion for the Court.
156
Ballew reflects a fundamental conflict between science and
law.15 7  Courts have relatively little latitude in choosing what
154 In Ballew, the Court granted certiorari to consider the following question:
"Whether a jury comprised of five persons is sufficient to afford an accused in a
criminal prosecution the right to trial by jury granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution?" Petition for Certiorari at 2, Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (No. 76-761). The Supreme Court's Rule 14.1(a)
states: "Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will
be considered by the Court." SuP. CT. R. 14.1(a). For a discussion regarding the
"unprecedented" character of departures from the rule without supplemental briefing
or argument, see Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 n.3 (1990).
15' Although none of the studies cited in Ballew specifically compared five-person
panels to six-person panels, several analyzed the potential effects of panel size over
a wide range. See, e.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical
Research and the Juiy-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643, 690-91 (1975) (reviewing
numerous empirical studies, including research which examined five- and six-person
panels); Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Juy Size and
Fraction Required to Convic4 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933, 945, 956 (1976) (using statistical
models to compare probabilities of convictions and errors for panels ranging from
one to fifteen in number); Thomas & Fink, Effects of Group Size, 60 PSYCHOLOCICAL
BULL. 371 (1963) (reviewing similar studies).
156 It must be noted that, while Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion
establishing the constitutional floor at six, onlyJustice Stevens joined his reliance on
the research. In fact, Justice Powell wrote acerbicly, "I have reservations as to the
wisdom-as well as the necessity-of Mr.Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numer-
ology derived from statistical studies." Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell,J., concurring).
ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Rehnquistjoined Powell's concurrence. See id. at
245.157 For good general overviews on the relationship between law and social science,
see Monahan & Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 441 (1982);
Rosenblum, A Place for Social Science Along theJudiciaty's Constitutional Law Frontier,
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questions to decide and they must be expedient in providing
answers. In the law, an answer based on incomplete information is
often better than no answer at all. In contrast, scientists set their
own agenda and have the luxury of seeking truth unconstrained by
the demands of court dockets. Scientific explanations based on
incomplete information are rarely better than withholding judgment
pending more information. Still, many scientists set their agendas
on the basis of questions the Court asks. This was typical of the
research conducted after Williams. 15 8 The Court, however, had
already "answered" the question of the constitutionality of six-
member panels and now addressed the constitutionality of five-
member panels. The social scientists arrived too late.
The conflicts inherent in the methods of law versus the methods
of science do not necessarily render the two disciplines incompati-
ble. 159  But these conflicts exacerbate the Court's already well
developed tendency to "interpret" empirical research in light of its
own jurisprudential mandates. The costs appear to be lower in
"interpreting" facts rather than finding them. Following the facts
wherever they lead might require modifying or overruling precedent
and might create uncertainty over the state of the law pending
scientific research. 160  The Court's tendency toward revisionist
interpretations is especially marked where the data contradict the
Court's prior judgments. The next section reviews cases in which
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 455 (1971); Saks, EnhancingandRestrainingAccuracy in Adjudication,
51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1988).
158 See, e.g., Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-
Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32J. PERSONALI-
TY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2-3 (1975) ("In Williams vs. Florida (1970), the Court
found that there was no constitutional bar to states settingjury sizes at some number
less than the traditional 12 .... Given the importance of the decisions juries
frequently make, empirical work is obviously required."); Nagel & Neef, supra note
155, at 933-34 ("[T]he United States Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida that
due process is not violated ifa state chooses to conduct criminal cases with six-person
juries rather than twelve-person juries.... [B]ut there is still no systematic analysis
of the fundamental issue raised by Williams .... . (footnote omitted)).
159 Some commentators suggest that the paradigms of law and science are so
incompatible that the latter can have very little impact on the former. See, e.g., Haney,
Psychology and Legal Change: On 1he Limits of a FactualJurisprudence, 4 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 147, 158 (1980) (discussing "[s]ubstantial differences... between the styles
and methods of reasoning, proof, andjustification used in psychology and law"). For
a contrary view, see Rosenblum, Affinity and Tension in Relationships Between Social
Science and Law, 33 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 18 (1988) ("[L]aw and social science are each
too important as dimensions of the other to be practiced in narcissistic insularity.").
160 There are significant and perhaps greater costs associated with failing to follow
facts wherever they might lead. See infra notes 270-82 and accompanying text.
"NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING"
the Court has fashioned its own conception of the facts, either
despite research to the contrary or because no data are available on
the relevant question.
C. When the Court Finds Its Own Facts
The Court stands on familiar ground when it advances constitu-
tional facts without benefit of scientific input. The previous two
sections examined the Court's strategy when scientific authority
could be used to support its decisions. This section examines cases
in which scientific authority fails to support the Court's preconcep-
tions or does not exist at all. When empirical research is available
but contradictory, the Court misconstrues or rejects it in order to
follow its own predilections. When empirical research is unavail-
able, the Court still follows its own predilections, although some-
times expressing regret that no data exist to assist it. When the
Court has expressed regret about the absence of data, social
scientists have been quick to respond. This section first examines
the Court's response to empirical data that contradict expectations.
Next, the section reviews examples of cases in which the Court
requested data, and how the Court responded to subsequently
accumulated data that failed to confirin expectations.
1. Misconstruing or Ignoring Contradictory Data
Little frustrates researchers more than when the Court miscon-
strues available data. The solution seems simple enough: educa-
tion. Scientists, therefore, cannot understand the Court's continu-
ing ignorance of scientific research. But such errors do not simply
demonstrate the Court's failure to appreciate research methods.
Rather, these errors illustrate the Court's struggle to integrate new
factual information into a preexisting constitutional framework.
Because the Court perceives facts normatively, this integration is
bound to conflict with scientists' expectations.
a. Barefoot v. Estelle
Barefoot v. Estelle161 concerned a Texas statute that requires a
jury at the capital sentencing hearing to find, prior to imposing the
death penalty, that "there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
161 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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threat to society ... "162 The petitioner challenged ,his convic-
tion on the basis that psychiatrists and psychologists cannot "predict
with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular criminal will
commit other crimes in the future and so represent a danger to the
community."163 The American Psychiatric Association (APA) filed
an amicus brief supporting this assessment. The APA brief reported
a multitude of studies which estimate that two out of three
predictions of long-term dangerousness are wrong.
164
Justice White, writing for the Court, refused to be persuaded by
the research indicating the inevitable fallibility of psychiatric
predictions of violence. White's opinion evidences a profound
misunderstanding of the petitioner's and the APA's argument. This
error appears attributable to his being forced to contend with data
that run counter to the Court's precedent. As White remarked,
"The suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented
with respect to a defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like
asking us to disinvent the wheel." 165  White found petitioner's
argument "contrary to our cases," 166 and advanced the following
logic to reject the data:
If the likelihood of a defendant's committing further crimes is a
constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death
penalty, which it isJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and if it is
not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that
conclusion, it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists,
out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion
on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they
should not be permitted to testify. Injurek, seven justices rejected
the claim that it was impossible to predict future behavior and that
162 TEX. CODE ]RIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981). Under Texas
law, in order to impose the death penalty, the jury also has to find that the conduct
was "committed deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result...." Id. art. 37.071(b)(1).
163 Barefoot 463 U.S. at 896.
164 See id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally J. MONAHAN, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 6 (1981) (stating that the academic and
professional communities widely accept the proposition that mental health profes-
sionals are highly inaccurate at predicting violent behavior); H. STFAbMAN & J.
COcOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 151 (1974) (indicating an error rate
of 80%); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clearand Convincing Evidence, 29 RtrrGERS L. REV. 1084, 1098 (1976) (citing research
reporting an error rate of 86%).
165 Barefoo 463 U.S. at 896.
166 Id.
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dangerousness was therefore an invalid consideration in imposing
the death penalty.
67
The logic of White's syllogism is irreproachable:
(1)Jurek holds that a dangerousness determination by a lay person is
a "constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty";
(2) All psychiatrists are also lay persons.
(3) Therefore, a dangerousness determination by a psychiatrist is a
"constitutionally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty."
There are, however, significant problems with the soundness of
White's syllogism, the least of which might be the continuing
validity of Jurek. Jurek can easily be distinguished from Barefoot on
the basis of the peculiar treatment accorded expert testimony.
68
What is particularly instructive about the decision is White's
struggle to integrate these constitutional facts into the fabric of
settled constitutional doctrine. White perceived the data in the
same way he might contemplate other potentially inconsistent facets
of constitutional interpretation, such as prior precedent or
contemporary values. The data had to be "interpreted" in light of
accepted doctrine. White's unwillingness to accept the radical
alternative of overruling precedent, and his inability to declare the
fact in issue irrelevant, led him to observe that despite psychiatrists'
significant error rate, the adversarial process provides the means by
which jurors can decide which psychiatrists are correct. In regard
to this belief, White made the remarkable assertion, "Neither
petitioner nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always
wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the
time."16 9 As Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent, this obser-
vation "misses the point completely," for "[o]ne can only wonder
167 Id. at 896-97.
168 All evidence codes mandate some prerequisite showing prior to the admission
of expert testimony, usually applying either the Fiye test or the relevancy test. See C.
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 604-10 (3d ed. 1984). Jurek's
holding thatjurors can take into account a defendant's purported dangerousness does
not necessarily mean that experts must be allowed to testify on that issue. If an
expert cannot assistjurors, or her testimony is not generally accepted in the pertinent
field, she should not be allowed to testify. The Court could have held, therefore, that
it would be unconstitutional to allow an "expert" to testify on the defendant's
purported dangerousness, but it is not unconstitutional for the jury to estimate the
defendant's character for violence when considering whether to impose the death
penalty. Many factual questions presented to juries pass constitutional scrutiny
without being the subject of expert testimony.
169 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
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how juries are to separate valid from invalid expert opinions when
the 'experts' themselves are so obviously unable to do so."
170
b. Parham v. J.R. and Constitutional Balancing
The Court again singularly interpreted constitutional facts in
Parham v. .R.,1 7 1 notwithstanding social science authority to the
contrary. The Parham Court held that the Constitution does not
require a due process hearing when parents seek "voluntary
commitments" of their children to state mental hospitals. 172 The
Constitution mandates only that children be committed subject to
the review of a physician acting as a "neutral factfinder." 173 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, observed that, among other
things, children are not "labeled" by voluntary commitments,
174
and that children are not as competent as adults to participate in
the decision-making process. 175 He also noted that due process
hearings ("time-consuming ... minuets") disrupt patient care,
176
exacerbate preexisting familial conflict, 177 and do not increase the
reliability and validity of psychiatric diagnosis. 178 Contrary to
Burger's suppositions, social science research indicates that children
are labeled and thus stigmatized by being committed to mental
hospitals179 and that most children after at least age fourteen are
developmentally competent enough to participate in the decision-
making process. 8 0  Moreover, research indicates that due pro-
170 Id. at 929 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
172 See id. at 606.
173 See id. at 606-07.
174 See id. at 600-01.
175 See id. at 602-03.
176 See id. at 605-06.
177 See id. at 610.
178 See id. at 609.
179 See Melton, Family and Mental Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minoi,
in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 151,158-59 (N. Reppucci, L. Weithorn,
E. Mulvey &J. Monahan eds. 1984).
180 See id. at 155-56. It should be noted that current research does not demon-
strate that adolescents are cognitively equivalent to adults. See, e.g., Gardner, Scherer
& Tester, Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal
Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 895 (1989) (examining the problems presented
when scientific data concerning decision-making capacities of minors is presented in
conjunction with a legal argument about minors' abortion rights). Research does
indicate, however, that adolescents are competent to participate in the decision-
making process. See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Infor7ned Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1596 (1982)
(concluding, based on empirical research, that adolescents are capable of meaningful
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cess hearings neither detract from patient care,181 nor lead to
greater conflict than already exists in the affected family 8 2 and,
in fact, the hearings increase the accuracy and accountability of
psychiatric diagnosis. 18 3  It is clear that Burger applied his
unsupported assumptions about reality to resolve the constitutional
question he had raised; it is less clear, however, that his acceptance
of the social science findings would have resulted in a different
conclusion.
In Parham, the Court used a balancing test, an interpretive
strategy that allows considerable flexibility when resolving constitu-
tional questions. Balancing has become the watchword of contem-
porary constitutional methodology. 8 4 Professor Aleinikoff identi-
fies a "balancing opinion" as one "that analyzes a constitutional
question by identifying interests implicated by the case and reaches
a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or
implicitly assigning values to the identified interests."1 8 5 Assign-
ing values to the identified interests comprises only one step of the
process. Reconciling the various factual contentions in light of
those value choices represents the core of the analysis. Balancing
not only fosters the fact-value conflict inherent in constitutional law,
but has the balancing Court wallowing in this conflict as well.
In Parham, Burger applied the classic balancing formula of
Mathews v. Eldridge,i8 6 which identified several interests to be
balanced:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the functiorr involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
8 7
participation in making personal decisions concerning health care).
181 See Melton, supra note 179, at 161-62.
182 See id. at 156-57.
183 See id. at 161-62.
184 See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancin& 96 YALE L.J. 943,964-
65 (1987); see also Karst, supra note 19, at 79-80 ("All judges balance competing
interests in deciding constitutional questions-even those who most vigorously deny
their willingness to do so.").
185 Aleinikoff, supra note 184, at 945.
188 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
187 Id. at 335, quoted in Parhamn, 442 U.S. at 599-600.
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The interests selected define the nature of the balance,
representing the metaphorical "scales of justice" arising from the
mandates of the Constitution. The actual' use of the balance
requires combining value judgments and empirical judgments on
one scale, and weighing them against similar judgments on the
other scales.
In Parham, three interests, or scales, had to be balanced. First,
Burger defined the privacy interest as incorporating the child's
assumed liberty interest, but added that the privacy interest also
extends to parents who historically have broad authority over minor
children.1 8  Empirically, Burger questioned the depth of the
infringement of the chilid's liberty interest resulting from civil
commitment,189 but cautioned that parental authority is not
unlimited, because parents do not always act in the best interest of
their children. 190 In regard to the second interest, the risk of
erroneous deprivations, Burger observed that a physician acting as
a "neutral factfinder" could be accurate1 91 and that time-consum-
ing due process hearings would guarantee no greater accuracy.
1 92
The third interest, according to Burger, implicated the govern-
ment's primary concern with reducing the obstacles to hospital
admission, in order to allow hospitals to carry out their mission and
to avoid discouraging families from using state mental health
facilities.
19 3
Under the Court's present practice, balancing allows maximum
flexibility with minimum accountability. Aleinikoff challenges the
viability of balancing, in principle, on the following basis:
Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of
subjectivity, make us spectators as the Court places the various
interests on the scales. The weighing mechanism remains a
mystery, and the result is simply read off the machine. Scientific
balancing decisions are neither opinions nor arguments that can
engage us; they are demonstrations.1
9 4
188 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 600.
189 See id. at 600-01.
190 See id. at 602-03.
191 See id. at 606-07.
192 See id. at 613.
193 See id. at 604-05.
194 Aleinikoff, supra note 184, at 993. Other commentators have also voiced
concern over the empirical component in balancing. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra
note 19, at 121. Professor Woolhandler notes:
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Although it is true that with balancing the weighing mechanism
can be mysterious, the true source of mystery comes from the
jumbling of the normative and empirical when doing the balance.
What should engage our constitutional imaginations are the factors
to be placed on the balance and the nature of the "weighing
mechanism." In order to maintain balancing as a viable constitu-
tional strategy, the Court must clearly state what facts have
constitutional import and what weight the Court attributes to these
facts.' 95 In Parham, for instance, the effect of civil commitments
on a child's liberty interest and the accuracy of physicians as
"neutral factfinders" are facts having constitutional relevance. How
these facts are balanced depends largely on the weight the Court
attaches to them and also on how confidently the Court knows the
facts. Of course, as the number of variables multiplies, the cogency
of the balance will begin to disintegrate.196 Still, the Court can
do much to identify more clearly than it has so far the constitution-
ally relevant facts and their respective constitutional weights. Once
these are established, the decision might very well depend on
scientific "demonstrations." The mystery of constitutional law
Formalizing the process forjudicial reception of legislative facts will increase
the hegemony of pragmatic balancing at the expense of other processes of
judicial reasoning. Increasing the influence of pragmatic balancing in
judicial decisionmaking will make the judicial process look more like the
legislative and administrative processes, and will undermine the legitimacy
of the courts.
Id.
"' Professor Michael Moore explicates the components of legal analysis as follows:
(1) statement of law, (2) statement of fact, and (3) interpretive statement (i.e.,
applying the statement of law to the statement of fact). See Moore, supra note 1, at
283. The confusion endemic in balancing arises out of a failure to keep these compo-
nents of legal analysis separate. On the legitimacy of viewing these components as
separate in the first place, see id. at 309-12.
196 Justice Cardozo captured the complexity of thejuncture of law and fact in the
process of legal thinking in the following passage:
In the present state of knowledge, the estimate of the comparative value of
one social interest and another, when they come, two or more of them, into
collision, will be shaped for the judge, as it is for the legislator, in accor-
dance with an act ofjudgment in which many elements cooperate. It will
be shaped by his experience of life; his understanding of the prevailing
canons ofjustice and morality; his study of the social sciences; at times, in
the end, by his intuitions, his guesses, even his ignorance or prejudice. The
web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and
colors, the skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seem to be simple,
are found, when analyzed, to be a complex and uncertain blend.
B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 85-86 (1924).
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deepens every time the Court fails to articulate empirical questions
clearly and, moreover, when it fails to accept valid empirical answers
when they are provided.
2. Calls for Data
When finding constitutional facts, the Justices often lament the
absence of social science research to aid them in their task.
Although many examples can be forwarded, 197 two stand out and
require special attention, United States v. Leon 198 and Witherspoon
v. Illinois.1 99
a. United States v. Leon
In Leon, the Court created a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. Central to the Court's holding was its estimation
of the effect a good-faith exception would have on deterring
constitutional violations by the police. Finding the empirical
research equivocal, 200 Justice White, writing for the majority,
assumed that the exception would have no significant effect on
police misconduct. 20 1 Justice Blackmun, however, wrote separate-
ly to emphasize that the holding might change if research demon-
strated the inaccuracy of -the Court's assumption:
[A]ny empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule
in a particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one.... If
it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expecta-
tions, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in
a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.
The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about
police conduct demands no less.
2 °2
197 See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (discussed supra notes 144-60
and accompanying text); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (same); see also
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578 (1981) ("Whatever may be the 'mischievous
potentialities [of broadcast coverage] for intruding upon the detached atmosphere
which should always surround the judicial process,' at present no one has been able
to present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere presence of the
broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect. .. ." (citations omitted)).
198 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
199 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
200 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6.
201 See id. at 918-21.
202 Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The Court has not had occasion to reconsider the assumption
in Leon, and empirical research remains equivocal on the validity of
that assumption.2°3 Even if, however, research clearly demon-
strated an error in the Court's empirical assumption, there is little
reason to be sanguine that the Court would pay much attention. If
the Court wished to reaffirm Leon, it might simply sweep the
research aside as invalid or shift to an alternative basis for its
holding, thereby rendering the research irrelevant. In Lockhart v.
McCree,20 4 the Court pursued both of these strategies in rejecting
the research it had requested in Witherspoon v. Illinois. I consider
the Lockhart Court's misinterpretation of the data in this Section,
and its rendering it irrelevant in section I(D).
b. Witherspoon v. Illinois and Lockhart v. McCree
In Witherspoon, the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Illinois statute providing that "[i]n trials for murder it shall be a
cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state
that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or
that he is opposed to the same." 20 5 The petitioner argued that
common sense and the research available indicate that excluding
jurors who oppose capital punishment (called "Witherspoon-exclud-
ables") would result in a jury biased in favor of conviction.
20 6
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, confirmed the relevance of
the question, and deplored the lack of information to answer it:
The data adduced by the petitioner ... are too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death
penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt.
We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now
before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of
jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresenta-
203 Uchida, Bynum, Rogan & Murasky, Acting in Good Faith: The Effects of United
States v. Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIz. L. REv. 467, 494 (1988), examined the
effects of Leon on police practices regarding search warrants and on factors relating
to search warrant practices at the trial level and found the decision to have had only
a minimal effect on the factors studied. As the authors recognize, their failure to find
an effect immediately following the Court's decision might indicate only that the full
impact of the decision has yet to be realized. See id.
204 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
205 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512.
206 See id. at 516-17.
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tive jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of
conviction.
20 7
Though the Court refused to rule that Illinois' juror exclusion
created a jury biased towards conviction, it did hold that the
selection process unconstitutionally created a jury biased towards
sentencing the defendant to death. 20 8  The Court explicitly left
open the possibility that future research would establish a positive
correlation between a jury's demonstrated bias toward capital
punishment and a propensity for finding a defendant guilty: "Even
so, a defendant convicted by such ajury in some future case might
still attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with
respect to guilt."
20 9
The social science community's response to the Court's entreaty
was extraordinary.2 10  Social scientists conducted more than a
dozen reported studies on the effects of excluding jurors opposed
to capital punishment.21 1 The near-consensus of the investigators
and reviewers of this research corroborated the intuitive judgment
of the petitioner in Witherspoon that excluding these jurors would
result in conviction prone juries.
2 12
Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) repudiated the validity of
the fifteen studies McCree introduced, because of "several serious
207 Id. at 517-18.
208 See id. at 523 ("Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at least
clear that its imposition by a hangingjury cannot be squared with the Constitution.").
209 Id. at 520 n.18. The Court continued as follows: "If he were to succeed in
that effort, the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting
the penalty issue to ajury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated
at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt
or innocence .... " Id.
210 See Finch & Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-Qualified Juries: On-
Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 24 (1986) ("In the seventeen years following
Witherspoon, death qualification has been one of the most studied subjects in the area
of sociological jurisprudence."). See generally Thompson, Death Qualification After
Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart v. McCree, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989)
(analyzing the Court's treatment of social science in constitutional litigation concern-
ing death qualification and discussing the future role of such research).
211 See Finch & Ferraro, supra note 210, at 25.
212 As Finch and Ferraro report, the data supported three hypotheses:
(1)jurors excluded because of their inability to impose the death penalty are
more attitudinally disposed to favor the accused than are non-excluded
jurors; (2) excluded jurors are more likely to be black or female than non-
excluded jurors; and (3) excluded jurors are more likely to actually acquit
than are non-excluded jurors.
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flaws" 213 he found in the research. He criticized eight studies for
dealing "solely with generalized attitudes and beliefs about the
death penalty and other aspects of the criminal justice system, and
... thus [being], at best, only marginally relevant to the constitu-
tionality of McGree's conviction." 214 Rehnquist's review, however,
failed to consider the possible relationship between attitude and
conduct, and did not explain the contrary conclusion drawn by the
lower court. 215  Rehnquist disparaged another study examining
the effect of the death qualification process on juror's attitudes,
because it "would not, standing alone, give rise to a constitutional
violation."2 16 Rehnquist failed to realize that no single study
could ever meet such a requirement; science is a collaborative
enterprise through which the testing and retesting of hypotheses
produce findings substantial enough to rely upon.
2 17
Rehnquist continued his divide and conquer strategy with the six
remaining studies, the only ones to examine specifically the effect
on verdicts of excluding "Witherspoon-excludables." Rehnquist
dismissed three studies because they were before the Court in
Witherspoon. Naturally, he believed, if "these studies were 'too
tentative and fragmentary' to make out a claim of constitutional
error in 1968, the same studies, unchanged but for having aged
some 18 years, are still insufficient to make out such a.claim in this
213 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168.
214 Id. at 169.
215 ChiefJudge Eisele of Arkansas observed that
the attitudinal surveys... clearly establish[] that ajuror's attitude toward
the death penalty is the most powerful known predictor of his overall
predisposition in a capital criminal case. That evidence shows that persons
who favor the death penalty are predisposed.in favor of the prosecution and
are uncommonly predisposed against the defendant. The evidence shows
that death penalty attitudes are highly correlated with other criminaljustice
attitudes. Generally, those who favor the death penalty are more likely to
trust prosecutors, distrust defense counsel, to believe the state's witnesses,
and to disapprove of certain of the accepted rights of defendants in criminal
cases. Ajury so selected will .... be composed of a group of persons who
are uncommonly predisposed to favor the prosecution, ajury "organized to
convict."
Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1304 (E.D. Ark. 1983), modified 758 F.2d 226
(8th Cir. 1985).
216 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added).
2 17 See generally E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC
OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 12 (1961) (discussing the differences between scientific
hypotheses and common sense beliefs and noting that scientific evidence must be
based on the "performance of those canons in an extensive class of inquiries").
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case. 218 Rehnquist failed to appreciate that what were initial
studies in 1968 had now been replicated and thereby supported in
the intervening eighteen years. 2 19 All findings in science must
necessarily begin as "tentative and fragmentary." Would Rehnquist
today dismiss the relevance of Albert Einstein's early work on the
special theory of relativity because it was tentative and fragmen-
tary?220 The principal measure of the value of a scientific hypoth-
esis is its ability to withstand repeated tests. The 1968 studies on
death-qualified juries have proven to be quite resilient.
221
As for the remaining three studies, Rehnquist complained, all of
them relied on mock jurors, two of the three studies failed to
simulate the process of jury deliberation, and only one of the
studies accounted for "nullifiers," that is, those individuals who can
properly be excluded, "because of their deep-seated opposition to
the death penalty" and who thus "would be unable to decide a
capital defendant's guilt or innocence fairly and impartially."
222
These criticisms overlook the substantial value of social science
research that does not exactly'replicate the trial process or that fails
to examine real jurors at trial-methods currently unavailable to
social scientists.223 Finally, Rehnquist rejected the one study that
used simulated jury deliberations and took into account "nullifiers"
as too slender a reed on which to rest a per se constitutional
rule.224 This criticism completely ignores the cumulative nature
of the scientific enterprise.
225
2 18 Lockhar, 476 U.S. at 171.
219 It should also be noted that the studies before the Witherspoon Court had not
yet been published. When the Lockhart Court considered them, all except for one
study had been published. See Thompson, supra note 210, at 197.22 0 See A. EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY (1920).
221 Not all social scientists agree that the data introduced in Lockhart v. McCree are
sufficient to support the conclusion that "death qualification" results in an increase
in conviction rates. In a recent article, Professor Rogers Elliott criticizes the
American Psychological Association's amicus brief in Lockhart for informing the Court
that such a relationship exists. Elliott argues that the data remain too tentative to
draw any firm conclusion regarding the effects of death qualification. See Elliott,
Social Science and the APA: The Lockhart Brief as a Case in Point (forthcoming 15 LAw
& HUM. BEHAV. (1991)). But see Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Wait for Godot?
(forthcoming 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. (1991)) (defending the decision to submit the
APA brief in Lockhart).
222 Lockhar 476 U.S. at 172.
223 See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 237 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is the courts who
have often stood in the way of surveys involving real jurors and we should not now
reject a study because of this deficiency."(footnote omitted)).
224 Lockhar, 476 U.S. at 172-73.
2 25 See Mahoney, Experimental Methods and Outcome Evaluation, 46J. CONSULTING
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Misconstruing or ignoring empirical research leaves the Court
open to broad attacks by critics who declaim the Court's ignorance.
In addition, by describing the research as not yet sufficient to rely
upon, the Court encourages further research endeavors. 226 The
possibility that the law will change, because either the Court will
someday learn to understand and use empirical techniques or future
research will indicate a contrary rule, leaves the Court's pronounce-
ments uncertain, a state the Court would presumably prefer to
avoid.227 An alternative strategy that avoids this uncertainty, and
which is gaining in popularity, is to render the particular fact
irrelevant by changing the constitutional question presented. The
following section reviews several cases in which the Court adopted
this very solution.
D. When the Court Changes the Law to Avoid the Facts
Much of Justice Rehnquist's Lockhart opinion is dedicated to
pointing out "some of the more serious problems"228 with the
social science studies introduced by the petitioner. Yet, after
expending considerable energy criticizing this research, Rehnquist
states that "we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish
that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more
'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries."229  Even
given this assumption, the Court held, "the Constitution does not
prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cas-
es."2 30 Rather than being inexplicable, this practice of accepting
the validity of empirical research, while simultaneously discounting
the relevance of that very research, is explained fully by the Court's
general treatment of science.
& CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 660, 660 (1978) ("The perfect experiment has yet to be
designed and is, in some sense, inconceivable." (citation omitted)).226 See Gross, Overruled: jury Neutrality in Capital Cases, STAN. LAW., Fall 1986, at
11, 11.
227 See id. at 13 ("[A] holding based solely on the insufficiency of the evidence
would have been an invitation for future litigation based on additional studies and
even fuller records, and the last thing the Court wanted was to face this claim
again.").
228 Lockhart4 476 U.S. at 173.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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1. Lockhart v. McCree
In his Lockhart opinion,. Rehnquist considered the social science
data to be irrelevant to McCree's constitutional claims. 23 1 But
McCree had advanced the data as being pertinent to Justice
Stevens's Witherspoon query: "[Does] the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment result[] in an unrepresentative jury
on the issue of guilt or substantially increase[] the risk of convic-
tion[?]" 23 2  Rehnquist's -opinion, without explicitly saying so,
repudiates Stevens's legal analysis.
The Eighth Circuit had ruled for McCree on the basis of
McCree's sixth amendment claim that death qualification deprives
the defendant of a jury that is representative of a cross-section of
the community.233 Rehnquist, however, rejected this argument,
observing, first, that the fair cross-section principle of the sixth
amendment has never been applied to petit juries.23 4 Moreover,
he asserted, even if the fair cross-section principle extended to petit
juries, this principle only extends to "distinctive groups," such as
blacks, women or Mexican-Americans, not to "groups defined solely
in terms of shared attitudes .... "235
Rehnquist also rejected McCree's fourteenth amendment claim
that "'death-qualification' violated his constitutional right to an
impartial jury."236 McCree's petition had relied on the standard
in Witherspoon concerned with whether, in the aggregate, death-
qualification would result in increased conviction rates.23 7 But in
Lockhart, Rehnquist shifted the Witherspoon standpoint from
determining whether qualified juries as a class might result in
higher conviction rates to whether a particular jury consists of
"juror' who will conscientiously apply the law and find the
facts." 23 8 McCree did not argue that his jury had not been impar-
tial, but rather that death qualification in general "tips the scales"
in the state's favor.239 The social science research, which indicat-
231 See id. at 183-84.
232 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 51.8.
23 See Lockhar4 476 U.S. at 173.
234 See id. at 173.
235 Id. at 174-75.
236 Id. at 177-78.
237 See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-17.
238 Lockhari, 476 U.S. at 178; see also Thompson, supra note 210, at 195 ("The
ultimate basis of [Lockhart] was not the Court's rejection of the social science research
.... but its rejection of the aggregate view ofjury impartiality." (footnote omitted)).
239 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178.
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ed a systemic bias, could not, and indeed can never, answer the
constitutional question posited by Rehnquist in Lockhart: can "the
jurors [in the particular case] conscientiously and properly carry out
their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts[?]" 240 By shifting
the perspective from concern over whether the aggregate effect of
death qualification increases conviction rates to concern over
whether death qualification created bias in the petitioner's jury,
Rehnquist rendered the research irrelevant. 241  In order to
achieve this result, he had to change the legal rule.
2. McCleskey v. Kemp
A second and perhaps more troubling example of the Court's
transforming the law in order to avoid the apparent ramifications
of empirical data is McCleskey v. Kemp.242  The petitioner in
McCleskey, a black man, was sentenced to death for the killing of a
white police officer during the course of a robbery. McCleskey
introduced at trial an extensive and sophisticated study conducted
by Professor David Baldus and others (the "Baldus study") indicat-
ing, among other things, that "defendants charged with killing white
victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
defendants charged with killing blacks."243 McCleskey proffered
the Baldus study in support of his claim that his death sentence
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Unlike the district court, which extensively reviewed the validity of
the Baldus study,244 the Supreme Court assumed the study's validi-
24 0 id. at 184.
24' Rehnquist also changed the pertinent facts in these kinds of cases from
legislative facts to adjudicative facts. For a discussion of the importance of such a
transformation, see infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
242 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
24 Id. at 287.
244 The district court found that the Baldus study was flawed in several respects.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 356-361 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 877
(11th Cir. 1985), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The district court's analysis, however, is
less than persuasive. See D. BALDUS, G. WOODWORTH & C.A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 340-69 (1990) [hereinafter D. BALDUS]; Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1388, 1398-1400 (1988). Also,Justices Blackmun and Stevens explicitly stated
their belief in the study's validity. Justice Blackmun wrote:
I agree with Justice Stevens' position that the proper course is to remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for determination of the validity of the
statistical evidence presented. Like Justice Stevens, however, I am
persuaded that the Baldus study is valid and would remand merely in the
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ty,245 but held, nonetheless, that McCleskey's claims failed under the
applicable law.
The Court first considered McCleskey's claim that his death
sentence violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. As Justice Powell, writing for the Court, explained, "a
defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden
of proving 'the existence of purposeful discrimination'" 246 which
"'had a discriminatory effect' on him."247 Hence, "McCleskey
must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discrimi-
natory purpose." 248 Just as in Lockhart, framing the question in
particularized terms limits the relevance of McCleskey's statistical
showing.249 Unlike Lockhart, equal protection claims traditionally
focus on the particular case, and the ultimate query concerns the
discriminatory intent of the decision-maker. Statistical demonstra-
tions are ill-suited to these kinds of questions. Yet, the Court has
sometimes accepted statistical proof standing alone to establish a
discrimination claim, specifically in claims of discrimination in
venire-selection under the fourteenth amendment and in Title VII
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.250
Justice Powell distinguished McCleskey's equal protection claim
from venire-selection and Title VII cases on several grounds. Powell
argued that "[i]n those cases, the statistics relate to fewer entities,
and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged decisions."
25 1
Moreover, in venire-selection and Title VII cases, Powell argued,
interest of orderly procedure.
McClekey, 481 U.S. at 345 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
245 The McCleskey Court, just as the Lockhart Court before it, felt it necessary to
also criticize the research methodology before declaring the data irrelevant. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 288-89 n.6; supra notes 213-25 and accompanying text.
246 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550
(1967)).
247 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
248 Id.
24 9 Seesupra notes 236-41 and accompanying text. McCleskey's expert explained
the inherent limitations of the statistical proof as follows:
Models that are developed talk about the effect on the average. They do
not depict the experience of a single individual. What they say, for exam-
ple, [is] that on the average, the race of the victim, if it is white, increases
on the average the probability... [that] the death sentence would be given.
Whether in a given case that is the answer, it cannot be determined
from statistics.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.11 (quoting McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 372).
250 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293-95.
251 Id. at 295 (footnotes omitted).
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"the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical
disparity,"252 whereas in a McCleskey-styled claim, public policy
prohibits requiring jurors to explain their decisions or having
prosecutors explain their reasons for seeking the death penalty.
2 53
Finally, citing the importance of upholding states' criminal laws
against murder and the discretion inherent in carrying out these
laws, Powell concluded that more than a naked statistical showing
was necessary to establish an equal protection violation.
2 54
Under Batson v. Kentucky255 and the framework of Castaneda
v. Partida,256 in venire-selection and Title VII cases the petitioner
must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination;
upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut
the petitioner's case. Statistical proof provides a formidable weapon
to petitioners in establishing prima facie cases and thereby in
requiring the respondent to explain the discriminatory impact. The
distinctions Powell drew between the contexts of venire-selection
and Title VII and capital sentencing do not justify treating Mc-
Cleskey's claim differently. The number of entities affected or the
number of variables taken into account in the decision-making
process should be irrelevant considerations if the factor of race
infects the process, as the Court assumes it does. Whether race
operates among a few factors or many, or if race influences the
judgments within just one entity or within several entities, it remains
a prohibited basis on which to rest a decision. The many variables
considered in capital sentencing decisions and the many entities
which participate in the decision-making process make it all the
more necessary to require the State to rebut the petitioner's prima
facie showing of discrimination. State officials are better situated
than petitioners to uncover such facts. The State need not question
individual jurors nor have each prosecutor explain her basis for
seeking the death penalty, but the State should have to offer a
substantiated alternative explanation for the discriminatory impact
of its sentencing scheme.
2 57
25 2 Id. at 296.
253 See id.
254 See id. at 297.
255 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
256 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
257 In fact, the State of Georgia did offer rebuttal evidence to the Baldus data.
Justice Blackmun explained the State's position as follows:
[T]he State's expert suggested that if the Baldus thesis was correct then the
aggravation level in black-victim cases where a life sentence was imposed
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Nonetheless, it must be admitted that extending Batson and
Castaneda to the capital sentencing context is not compelled by the
Court's precedent. In this regard, McCleskey's second ground for
challenging his sentence was clearly the stronger of the two.
McCleskey rested the second challenge to his sentence on eighth
amendment grounds. Consistently under the Court's prior cases,
the death penalty could "not be imposed under sentencing proce-
dures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 58  The defen-
dant does not have to prove that race affected his sentencing
decision; the eighth amendment's concern is the "sentencing system
as a whole." 259  Hence, the petitioner establishes a constitutional
violation by demonstrating a "pattern of arbitrary and capricious
sentencing." 260 This system-wide perspective is especially well
suited to statistical proof.
would be higher than in white-victim cases. The expert analyzed aggravating
and mitigating circumstances "one by one, demonstrating that in life sen-
tence cases, to the extent that any aggravating circumstance is more
prevalent in one group than the other, there are more aggravating features
in the group of white-victim cases than in the group of black-victim cases.
Conversely, there were more mitigating circumstances in which black-victim
cases had a higher proportion of that circumstance than in white-victim
cases.'
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 359-60 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 373 (N.D.Ga. 1984)).
Blackmun rejected the State's argument, observing-
The State's meager and unsophisticated evidence cannot withstand the
extensive scrutiny given the Baldus evidence.... [T]he State did not
"demonstrate that when th[e] factors were properly organized and account-
ed for there was no significant disparity" between the death sentences
imposed on defendants convicted of killing white victims and those imposed
on defendants convicted of killing black victims.
Id. at 360-61 (footnote omitted) (quoting Dazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 403-04
n.14 (1986).
258 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (emphasis added); see also
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,343 (1985) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (reason-
ing that death sentence must be invalidated when circumstances indicate "an
unacceptable risk that 'the death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or
capriciously' or through 'whim ... or mistake'" (emphasis added) (quoting California
v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118
(1982)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It
would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is
'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play
of such prejudices.").
259 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976).
260 Id. at 195 n.46.
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The Baldus study appears to have substantiated just such a
"pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing." Justice Brennan
summarized some of the inferences to be drawn from the Baldus
study as follows:
For the Georgia system as a whole, race accounts for a six
percentage point difference in the rate at which capital punish-
ment is imposed. Since death is imposed in 11% of all white-
victim cases, the rate in comparably aggravated black-victim cases
is 5%. The rate of capital sentencing in a white-victim case is thus
120% greater than the rate in a black victim case. Put another
way, over half-55%-of defendants in white-victim crimes in
Georgia would not have been sentenced to die if their victims had
been black. Of the more than 200 variables potentially relevant to
a sentencing decision, race of the victim is a powerful explanation
for variation in death sentence rates-as powerful as nonracial
aggravating factors such as a prior murder conviction or acting as
the principal planner of the homicide.
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The majority, however, rejected the perspective of the prior case
law which interpreted the eighth amendment as concerned with the
risk of arbitrary and capricious decisions in the system as a whole.
Instead, Powell again turned to McCleskey's particular case and
queried whether racial considerations infected his jury. This
particularized inquiry rendered the statistical proof irrelevant:
"Even Professor Baldus does not contend that his statistics prove...
that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case."
262 Powell
recognized that "some risk" of racial prejudice might influence a
jury's decision, but he refused to be persuaded about the gravity of
this risk on the basis of the Baldus study.26 3 Moreover, as Rehn-
quist had done in Lockhart and White had done in Barefoot, Powell
preferred to put his faith in the judicial process. 264  Powell ex-
261 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 308. Powell quoted Baldus's testimony on this matter as follows:
"McCleskey's case falls in [a] grey area where ... you would find the
greatest likelihood that some inappropriate consideration may have come
to bear on the decision.
"In an analysis of this type, obviously one cannot say that we can say to
a moral certainty what it was that influenced the decision. We can't do
that."
Id. at 308 n.29.
263 The reader should recall Powell's reference to the statistical data introduced
in Ballew v. Georgia as being the product of "numerology," see supra note 156, to
perhaps explain his reaction to the Baldus study.264 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 ("Our efforts have been guided by our recogni-
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plained that "McCleskey's argument that the Constitution condemns
the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital
sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of
discretion in our criminal justice system."2 65 Therefore, in order
to establish an eighth amendment violation, the petitioner must
introduce evidence that the discretion invested in the prosecutor or
jury in his particular case resulted in an arbitrary or capricious
decision, 266 not that such discretion in the system permits such
results.
Lockhart and McCleskey illustrate how the Court can manipulate
the law in order to change the impact of empirical research. In
both cases, the Court shifted the precedent's system-wide perspec-
tive, which encouraged scientific research, to a particularized
perspective that rendered. the research conducted irrelevant.
267
This legal legerdemain confounds researchers. Indeed, the Court's
overall handling of empirical research has been a constant source of
frustration for scientists. 268 This history of manipulation might
appear to lessen the value of science to constitutional law. In
reality, this history substantiates the role of scientific fact-finding as
a viable restraining principle of constitutional interpretation.
E. Conclusion
The modern Court's use of empirical research continues the
inveterate tradition of normative constitutional fact-finding.
269
tion that 'the inestimable privilege of trial by jury... is a vital principle, underlying
the whole administration of criminal justice.'" (quoting Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 123 (1866))).
265 Id. at 311.
266 See id. at 306-08.
267 See Lempert, supra note 26, at 187-88.
268 See, e.g., Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreine Court's Response to Empiical
Research on Capital Punishmen in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 177, 208 (K. Haas & J. Inciardi eds. 1988) ("The
parsimonious explanation for the failure of social science data to influence the Court
in death penalty cases seems to be that the outcome of these cases is frequently a
foregone conclusion.").
29just last term the Court decided Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990)
and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990), two
abortion cases replete with value judgments masquerading as factual assertions. In
Hodgson the Court struck down Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement
when implemented without ajudicial bypass procedure but upheld the two-parent
requirement when it was accompanied by such a procedure. In reaching its holdings
in these two cases, the Court relied considerably on normative constitutional fact-
finding. Many examples could be provided, but the most telling might be the
"NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING"
In Brown and Roe, for instance, facts gave shape to constitutional
law. As a measure of reality, however, these facts were only an
approximation. As illustrated clearly by Ballew, Barefoot, and
Parham, the Court's factual assertions depended not on real world
circumstances, but rather on constitutional necessities. Facts were
things to be integrated (and sometimes manipulated) into the
constitutional fabric that already existed. But the Court's fictions
were destined to come into conflict with reality. In Lockhart and
McCleskey the inevitable occurred when the Court's "facts" came face
to face with the real things. The Court responded by avoiding
reality again, seeking safety in an altered constitutional structure.
As the next section demonstrates, such flight does not guarantee
safe harbor.
III. SCIENTIFIC FACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SCIENCE AS A RESTRAINING FORCE
The previous two sections explored the prevalence of fact-
finding as a marker on the path of constitutional interpretation.
Those sections sought to illustrate how facts combine with and
substitute for the normative judgments and other authorities that
shape the text. In order to be a true interpretive instrument,
however, fact-finding must not only guide the Court, it must also
restrain the Court. Sources of interpretation provide the authority
for constitutional law-making and, at the same time, establish
parameters by which to measure the Court's decisions. The
principal objection to the claim that facts restrain the Court's
discretion can be found in the last section's demonstration of how
readily the Court manipulates, misunderstands, and ignores
following from Akron Centen
A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its members should
attain a dearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound philosophic
choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether to seek an
abortion. Her decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity,
and the origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo. The
State is entitled to assume that, for most of its people, the beginnings of
that understanding will be within the family, society's most intimate
association. It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in
most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor
advice that is both compassionate and mature.
Akron Centei; 110 S. Ct. at 2983-84. Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, observed
otherwise: "Where trust and confidence exist within the family structure, it is likely
that communication already exists." Id. at 2990 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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empirical research. How can data so easily avoided be a viable
restraint? Facts can be stubborn things, however, and when
supposititious they can infect the probity of the final result. The
Court's legitimacy depends on such probity. It is in this way that
empirical research restrains the Court.
As the only unelected branch of the federal government, the
judiciary must constantly reflect upon its own legitimacy. Alexander
Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 78 that the judiciary has "neither
Force nor Will, but merely judgment."27° The Court's efficacy
depends on the public being persuaded by its judgments. Although
the Court is acutely aware of this lesson, it still regularly exhibits
much maneuverability when reading the Constitution. But
discretion is a necessary part of every judge's job description. The
value of a restraining principle lies in its cabining that discretion,
not eliminating it. The Court retains legitimacy only so long as it
remains within accepted bounds when exercising its discretion.
Empirical research assists in the definition and enforcement of
those boundaries.
A. Bringing Empirical Research to Bear
Sources of interpretation restrain to the extent they provide a
degree of external control over the Court's proclamations. In order
to demonstrate the restraining effect of empirical data, however, it
need not be shown that the Court consistently heeds that data.
Given the previous discussion, such a showing would not be possible
in any event. The value of science as a check on discretion must be
compared to the value of the traditional sources of authority.
Sources of authority restrain fairly modestly, typically by establishing
the grounds for debate and the boundaries beyond which the Court
may not venture. Much interpretive leeway remains.
In order to be effective, empirical research must be brought to
the judiciary's attention through critical commentary which has
substance, i.e., there must be a "there there."27 1  Principally,
270 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
271 My thanks to Gertrude Stein for the phrase and my apologies to the city of
Oakland, California for using it:
She took us to see her granddaughter who was teaching in the Dominican
convent in San Raphael, we went across the bay on a ferry, that had not
changed but Goat Island might just as well not have been there, anyway
what was the use of my having come from Oakland it was not natural to
have come from there yes write about it if I like or anything if I like but not
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interpretive sources restrain through critical debate-commentary by
dissenting Justices, scholars, politicians, the press, and the general
public-a dialogue which influences acceptance of the Court's
rulings. As compared to the traditional authorities, empirical
research possesses much substance and has as much potential to
contribute to constitutional law-making.
1. Critical Commentary
The value of science as a check on discretion must be compared
to the traditional sources of interpretation. The Court is often
accused of mishandling the constitutional text, the framers' original
intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and contemporary
values. The critical response which routinely follows these alleged
errors surely influences the Court.27 2 In a very real sense, com-
mentators carry on a dialogue with the Court. Although in any one
opinion the Court obviously cannot satisfy all of its critics, critical
commentary undoubtedly influences subsequent cases.273 The
Court's ignorance of, or disdain for, science similarly leads to
scholarly attempts to educate the Justices, which in some measure
influence their later decisions. In this way, science functions like
the other sources of interpretation in shaping the contours of the
Constitution.
Whenever the Justices misuse empirical research, they become
the subjects of significant criticism. 274 In fact, such critical review
has probably made the Justices nervous about delving into the
there, there is no there there.
G. STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (Ist ed. 1937).
272 See generally White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Cfiticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 291-96 (1973) (discussing critical
response and Warren Court decisions).27
3 See generally Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918
(1953) (noting the importance of law review commentary); Hoffman, Law Reviews and
the Bench, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 17, 18 (1956) (same); Martin, The Law Review Citadel:
Rodell Revisited, 71 IoWA L. REv. 1093, 1095-96 (1986) (arguing that law review
articles play a major role in judicial opinions); Newland, Legal Periodicals and the
United States Suprene Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (1959) (noting the
frequency of citation of law review articles in Supreme Court decisions); Warren,
Upon the Tenth Anniversay of the UCLA Law Review, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1962)
(noting the importance of law review criticisms).
274 See e.g., Bersoff, supra note 27, at 155 (criticizing the Court's use of social
science in the "death-qualification" cases); Ellsworth, supra note 268, at 194-204
(same); Kaye, supra note 150, at 1007.08 (criticizing the Court's use of social science
in the jury size cases); Thompson, supra note 210, at 195-98 (criticizing the Court's
use of social science in the "death-qualification" cases).
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niceties of research methodology at any time. Justice Brennan
reflected this concern in Craig v. Boren,275 when he remarked that
"[i]t is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state
officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical
technique."276 Perhaps the Justices cannot be expected to be
experts, but certainly they must have a working knowledge of these
techniques. As Oliver Wendell Holmes understood nearly one
hundred years ago: "For the rational study of the law the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future
is the man of statistics and the master of economics." 277 Holmes
has been proved correct. Too much of the Court's docket requires
a knowledge of empirical techniques for the Court to continue
pleading non sum informatus.
Ultimately, persistent misapplication of empirical data under-
mines the Court's legitimacy.2 78 Foremost, the Court itself will be
reproached for failing to answer the evidence which contradicts its
vision of reality. Empirical research is simply not that difficult to
understand. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated the
aptitude to use statistical data279 as well as to understand the
essence of the scientific method. 28 0 Furthermore, rulings which
rest on suspect factual bases will themselves be suspect. Holdings
resting on faulty premises have little or no persuasiveness, for they
lack rationality-the source of judicial power.
Still, the social sciences, the disciplines which supply most of the
legally relevant empirical :research, are the subject of much criticism
for being less than "scientific." Without question, much social
inquiry dressed in the guise of science has little value as science and
ought to play a very small role, if any, in legal decision-making.
28 '
In principle, however, the social sciences can be as objective and
scientific as their more heralded cousins, the natural sciences.
28 2
275 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
276 Id. at 204.
277 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
278 See A. BICKEL (2d ed. 1986), supra note 5, at 27.
279 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121-22 (1989)
(rejecting petitioner's statistics for failure to use the proper sample population);
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977) (analyzing statistical disparities
between grand jury composition and the surrounding county).280 Cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596 n.18 (1987) (exploring the meaning
of the term "creation science").
281 See Faigman, supra note 14, at 1066-79 (discussing the relevance of supposi-
tional science).
282 See id. at 1026-51.
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More importantly, empirical research can be evaluated on the basis
of its accuracy which, after all, should be the criterion of effective
fact-finding. Ultimately, the vitality of any constitutional authority,
including fact-finding, turns on its substantive content.
2. Is There a "There There"?
It is instructive to compare empirical research to the two most
accepted sources of interpretation, the text and original intent.
283
The efficacy of the text and original intent in establishing bound-
aries is inversely related to the amount of ambiguity they contain.
The greater the consensus regarding the definition of the words
used or the intended meaning of those who drafted the words, the
less the Court is able to depart from that meaning. The more
certain and more objective the information relevant to a particular
interpretation, the less the Court is able to do what it pleases. For
example, only the rare commentator suggests that the Court should
not read literally the requirement in article II that the President
"shall have attained ... the age of thirty five years;" 284 the Court's
failure to read the clause literally would seriously undermine its
legitimacy. Conversely, words loaded with ambiguity, such as "due
process" and "equal protection," impart little authoritative guidance
and permit the Court substantial interpretive leeway.
283 The Court consistently expresses fidelity to the text, see sources supra note 1,
as well as to the framers' original intent respecting the text. See tenBroek, Use by the
United States Supremne Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L.
REV. 399, 399 (1939) (stating that the Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted
regularity, that the end object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the
intention of those persons who formulated the instrument"). In addition, virtually
all scholars agree that the text, and most agree that original intent, are relevant to
interpreting the Constitution. Recently, however, Professor H. Jefferson Powell
sparked a stirring debate by arguing that the framers did not intend future interpret-
ers to heed their personal intentions. See Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Inten4 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). But see Berger, "Original Intention" in
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 296 (1986) (attempting to refute Powell's
claims). For further debate on the issue, see Berger, The Founders' Views-According
to Jefferson Powel4 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (1989); Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding
of Original Intent (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987) (reviewing R.
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)).
284 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. At least one commentator has suggested that the
thirty-five-year age requirement need not be read literally. See Peller, The Metaphysics
ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985) ("It is possible the age thirty-five
signified to the Framers a certain level of maturity rather than some intrinsically
significant number of years. If so, it is open to argument whether the translation in
our social universe of the clause still means thirty-five years of age.").
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The same relationship between ambiguity and authority pertains
to original intent. The classic example of this connection occurred
in the desegregation litigation of Brown v. Board of Education. An
intermediate court asked both sides for further argument on the
intention of the framers of the fourteenth amendment regarding
public school segregation. 285  Volumes of historical scholarship
were offered by the litigants. The historians, however, could not
reach consensus on the matter. The Court later dismissed these
materials, stating, "At best, they are inconclusive." 28 6 Ironically,
perhaps, the Court then turned to empirical research for its
authority.
287
On the whole, traditional sources of authority contain great
areas of ambiguity. Empirical research shares this failing. Especial-
ly in the realm of social inquiry, research remains very uneven.
Many studies contain important and accurate information that the
law can rely upon; at the same time, much social research has little
or no value. Moreover, many legal-empirical questions are very
difficult to study or are not amenable to scientific scrutiny at all.
Nevertheless, in comparison to the other sources of authority,
empirical research fares quite well.
Science has one main advantage over the other sources of
interpretation: replicability. The validity of hypotheses about the
world of constitutional facts does not depend on "plain meaning,"
the materials discovered in historical archives, logical argument, or
moral persuasion.28 8 The validity of a factual statement depends
on its amenability to testing and its having survived tests designed
to falsify it.28 9  Whereas the ambiguity of the drafters' intent
285 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (miscellaneous orders).
286 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
287 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
288 See Munzer, Realistic Linits on Realist Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 459,465
(1985) ("[S]cientific investigation seems different from moral inquiry. It would be
strange for a person who believes in objective moral truth to speak of formulating
hypotheses and devising experiments to confirm or falsify them."). See generally
Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 1061 (discussing whether there is moral
reality, and if there is, how one finds it).
289 Many statements purport to describe reality, so some criterion is needed to
distinguish between scientific-objective and nonscientific-subjective statements. This
has been called the "problem of demarcation." K. POPPER, CONJECTURE AND REFUTA-
TIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 39 (1963). According to Popper,
"the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively
tested." K. POPPER, supra note 25, at 39. A subjective view of reality, or hypothesis,
attains objectivity through systematic test or, stated another way, attempts to falsify
it. In short, "an idea.., acquires scientific status only when it [can be]... falsified."
"NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING"
might continue, because of documents lost or never prepared,
ambiguity about constitutional facts can be reduced by more and
better research. Does the race of the victim affect capital sentenc-
ing? This question, just like innumerable others, can be subjected
again and again to scientific inquiry. If the Baldus study contains
flaws that undermine its credibility, new research can be conducted
without those flaws. This lesson is the essence of the scientific
process. To be sure, most legal-empirical questions will never be
resolved fully, and much ambiguity will remain following even the
most sophisticated research program. 290 But absolute certainty
has never been a criterion for constitutional decision-making.
Empirical research only assists, just as the traditional authorities do,
in the navigation of the enigmatic pathways of the Constitution.
B. The Extra-Textual Authority of Empirical Research
The claim here is not that empirical research will ever mandate
particular textual interpretations. This feature somewhat distin-
guishes fact-finding from the other sources of interpretation-but
not by very much. Obviously, the text sometimes dictates particular
results and original intent might occasionally do the same. These
occurrences are rare, however, and in general the importance of the
several sources of interpretation lies in the dynamic they create
between the Court, the Constitution, and society. In this way, fact-
K. POPPER, supra at 37. A theory's value can be measured only by its success at
describing or predicting events whose observation corroborates it. Theories, however,
can never be proven true, because observations consistent with one theory may be
accounted for by an alternative theory with greater explanatory power. On the other
hand, theories can be falsified when observations depart significantly from expecta-
tion. In sum, the status of a statement as scientific depends on its amenability to test;
the merit of a scientific statement depends on the degree to which it has survived
attempts at falsification.
290 Much disagreement exists within the social science community concerning the
value of various empirical methods. Of course, in this regard, social scientists do not
differ significantly from experts who research the traditional sources of constitutional
authority. Whether concerned with interpreting literary texts, or searching for
historical facts, or identifying causes of human behavior, the methods scholars use
within their respective disciplines differ markedly. Still, every discipline contains
methodological guidelines which establish boundaries of acceptable scholarship.
Indeed, given the nature of their enterprise, social scientists, as long as they view
themselves as scientists, must adhere to certain accepted canons of research method-
ology. See Faigman, supra note 14, at 1021-25, 1052-66 (outlining the methods of
scientific and pseudo-scientific research and discussing the relevance to the law of
findings obtained using these methods); Monahan & Walker, supra note 92, at 498-
508 (discussinga frameworkin which the value of empirical research can be assessed).
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finding is an integral part of the interpretive calculus. As noted
earlier, fact and law in constitutional analysis are bound together as
on a "monkey rope." 291 Tightening or slackening of one neces-
sarily affects the other. There is no better example of this than
McCleskey v. Kemp.
2 92
In McCleskey, as discussed previously, Justice Powell assumed the
validity of the Baldus study, which indicated that defendants who
killed whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
defendants who killed blacks. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court
upheld McCleskey's sentence. The statistics, Powell explained,
could not prove "that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular
case."293 Yet the eighth amendment had never been interpreted
to require such a particularized showing; "a substantial risk that the
punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner"294 was the standard prior to McCleskey. In its effort to avoid
the lessons of the data, the Court substantially modified prior
constitutional doctrine.
The reader might well question how the McCleskey Court's
seemingly simple sleight of hand evidences social science's restrain-
ing influence. The Court still reached the result it desired. But the
Court's acceptance of the data forced it to confront the value
choices it was making. Throughout its history, the Court has
advanced certain facts that, in actuality, substituted for value
identification. From Marbury v. Madison295 to Brown v. Board of
Education29 6 to Roe v. Wade,297 the Court's fact-finding has been
essentially normative; at bottom, this has meant that the Court
would assert facts to support policy-making that could not stand
very well on its own. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall could have
justified judicial review without implying that the legislature would
not discipline itself under the Constitution; in Brown, Chief Justice
Warren could have struck -down segregated schools without invoking
social science data; and in Roe, Justice Blackmun could have upheld
a woman's right to choose an abortion without relying on medical
theories of fetal viability. But in each of these cases, and in scores
of others, the Court has found it expedient to invoke factual
291 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
292 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
293 Id. at 308.
294 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (emphasis added).
295 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
296 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see supra notes 91-122 and accompanying text.
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
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suppositions in lieu of declaring a normative judgment. Undoubt-
edly, the McCleskey Court would have preferred to state that there
is no evidence of differential treatment on the basis of race of the
victim and that any such systemic discrimination would violate the
eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. But
the Court could not say this because the data indicated otherwise.
In transforming the law in order to achieve the desired outcome,
the Court had to confront difficult normative questions.
Although he minimized its import, Powell understood that "the
Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with
race."298 This fact had to be addressed. Powell responded with
two arguments, both of which can be characterized as products of
political necessity. First, Powell observed, "McCleskey's claim, taken
to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles
that underlie our entire criminal justice system." 299 Powell then
questioned whether studies demonstrating racially based disparities
in other punishments or disparities involving gender would establish
eighth amendment claims. 00 Powell secondly urged that these
sorts of statistical demonstrations "are best presented to the
legislative bodies."30 1 "Legislatures," Powell asserted, "are better
qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies in
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of
approach that is not available to the courts.'"302 The Baldus data
thus forced the Court to confront and articulate the actual, albeit
difficult, normative bases for its decision. 03, Commentary there-
after can focus, as it should, on the constitutional acceptability of
racial bias in capital sentencing. This critical debate might have
been lost, or diluted, if the Court had avoided the matter by resting
its judgment on a supposed factual basis.
The Court's acceptance of racial bias in capital sentencing,
whatever the reasons for so doing, cost the Court politically. The
Court's legitimacy depends largely on its perceived integrity.
However weighty the normative arguments, permitting this result
might be, it is a result not easily reached in view of our constitution-
298 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
299 rd. at 314-15. See generally, D. BALDUS, supra note 244.
300 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315-17.
501 Id. at 319.
302 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
30' Arguably, the latter basis for the decision, that the legislatures "are better
qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of statistical studies,'" id., is in part an
empirical assumption as well.
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al traditionA0 4 In forcing the Court to recognize the racial bias
in capital sentencing, the data constricted the Court. Because the
facts could not be manipulated or ignored, the Court became more
accountable for its decision. The data forced the Court to explicate
an alternative basis for its judgment-a normative basis rather than
an empirical one. Thisjudgment is now subjected to the harsh light
of public debate.
Empirical data introduced in one case also affect subsequent
decisions. By forcing the Court to identify its value choices, and
when, as. in McCleskey, these choices lie at the fringes of legitimacy,
empirical data restrict the Court's judgments in subsequent cases by
exposing the thinness of the authority supporting its precedent.
Allowing McCleskey to rest on the factual premise that racial
discrimination does not permeate capital sentencing decisions
would have freed the Court's hand in later cases. Therefore, not
only does brute reality force the Court to explain its value choices
in a particular case, but it. will have a ripple effect through subse-
quent cases.
This ripple effect has other permutations as well, several of
which have profoundly negative connotations. First of all, McCleskey
affected the strategy that subsequent petitioners must pursue in
fourteenth amendment claims, from arguing disparate impact to
arguing purposeful discrimination, and eighth amendment claims,
from arguing systemic bias to arguing individualized bias. In effect,
the Court transformed the inquiry in these cases from legislative
fact questions to adjudicative fact questions. 30 5 The transforma-
tion from the legislative to the adjudicative also effectively reverses
the burdens of proof. If the McCleskey Court had accepted the
disparate impact principle of venire selection and Title VII cases in
its fourteenth amendment analysis, then once the petitioner
established a prima facie case of discrimination, the government
would bear the burden to explain the discriminatory impact.
3 0 6
Instead, the Court places the burden of proof on petitioners to
demonstrate purposeful discrimination. If the McCleskey Court had
retained the system-wide perspective of the precedent in its eighth
304 See Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will be Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. Times,
May 1, 1987, § 2, at 5, col. 1; see also Kennedy, supra note 244, at 1388-89 (noting that
the Court's decision in McCleskey was immediately beset by sharp criticism and, in
some instances, outright denunciation).
505 Or, in my lexicon, from "constitutional-review" facts to "constitutional-
adjudicative" facts. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
306 See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
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amendment analysis, the government would bear the burden of
identifying a compelling state interest to justify the risks of arbitrary
and capricious punishment.30 7 Instead, the Court placed the
burden of proof on petitioners to demonstrate individualized
discrimination.
Additionally, the Court's recent tendency to change the law in
order to avoid the facts affects a wide range of cases whose only
similarity is the constitutional provision from which they emanate.
Prior to McCleskey, for example, the eighth amendment standard had
been concerned with the risk of arbitrary or capricious decisions in
the system. After Mc~leskey, the focus is on the particular decision-
makers in the petitioner's case. How this new standard will affect
other eighth amendment cases remains to be seen. 308 For peti-
tioners with eighth amendment claims outside of the McCleskey
context, McCleskey is surely an unwelcome turn of events.
In light of these negative effects, the introduction of empirical
research into the McCleskey litigation might very well be character-
ized as a disaster. In the process of transforming the law to avoid
the facts, the Court now accepts racial bias in capital sentencing,
petitioners now effectively carry the burden of proof, and the
former eighth amendment protections now are in doubt. These
results are far from what the researchers intended. 0 9 But the
influence, as well as the value, of empirical research cannot be
measured in individual cases.
Taking a narrow view of McCleskey and similar cases, empirical
research might indeed complicate litigation and engender unexpect-
ed legal outcomes. A broader view, however, suggests an essential
role for empirical research in forcing the Court to tackle the
difficult normative issues before it. In McCleskey itself, the Court
struggled to come to terms with the implications of racial bias in
capital sentencing. This struggle might have been buried in factual
suppositions if not for the data. Further, although McCleskey
307 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
-o8 It is still too early to measure the effect of McCleskey outside the specific
context of that case. One decision that suggests the possible impact of McCleskey is
Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1988).
The Fuller court rejected statistical evidence indicating that the Georgia Parole Board
paroled white convicted rapists more often than black convicted rapists. The
statistical evidence, the court held, was "'clearly insufficient to support an inference
that any of the decisionmakers... acted with discriminatory purpose.'" Id. at 1310
(quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297).
309 See D. BALDUS, supra note 244, at 310.
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changes the landscape of eighth amendment litigation, this outcome
exerts pressure on the Court. The costs associated with transform-
ing a whole body of law to accommodate inconvenient facts create
an obstacle to unbridled discretion. By preventing the Court from
inventing convenient facts, empirical research compels the Court to
face up to the ramifications of its constitutional law-making.
CONCLUSION
In Craig v. Boren, Justice Brennan observed that "proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is ... in tension with the
normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection
Clause." 310 This tension, which extends to every corner of the
Constitution, largely explains the Court's normative approach to
questions of constitutional fact. From the start, facts, together with
the text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship, and
contemporary values, have served as authority for the Court's
explication of the Constitution. Yet, essentially, interpreting the
Constitution is a normative enterprise. Not surprisingly, therefore,
in "finding" facts, the Court's vision often has been affected by the
outcome it sought. Facts were molded into the fabric of the
Constitution itself, not as empirical reality but as legal imperative.
Through most of its history, the Court could manipulate facts in this
fashion with impunity. Although many might have disagreed with
the particular factual findings, no one could prove the Court's
observations wrong.
Today, much has changed. Researchers armed with volumes of
data regularly challenge the Court's factual statements. The Court
so far has responded to this challenge using the same strategy it has
always employed, viewing facts according to its vision of the
Constitution, rather than according to reality. This strategy has
limited efficacy, for the Court's empirical myopia ultimately
undermines its political legitimacy.
When the Court's factual observations depart from reality, the
rules attached to those observations become suspect. Empirical
research places an especially cogent check on judicial decision-
making by clarifying the factual premises upon which legal judg-
ments are based. If the Court rests a legal judgment on a factual
basis that empirical research indicates does not exist, the Court
must choose an alternative basis to support the rule or suffer the
310 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
1991] "NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT-FINDING" 613
slings and arrows of critical comment. If the Court decides to
retain the outcome and, to avoid appearing ignorant on the facts,
transform the legal rule, it must elaborate an alternative basis that
will support the decision. By not having the convenience of
sculpting the facts of each case, the Court is made more accountable
for its decisions. This accountability restrains the Court's constitu-
tional discretion.
Constitutional law-making inevitably involves the exercise of
considerable discretion. The Constitution supplies merely a map of
necessary destinations and a rather incomplete outline of the roads
needed to reach them. Reading this map requires consulting a
variety of authorities, none of which alone dictates the best road to
follow. Ultimately, the value of any constitutional authority is
measured by its capacity to keep the Court from getting lost. Using
this criterion, fact-finding serves as an important compass for
directing the Court in its constitutional travels.

